Results tagged “xGW”

Cross Posted at Red Herrings.

 

When considering the use of torture within the framework of XGW it becomes clear that torture has real utility at only three gradients of doctrine.

 

0GW Torture:

0GW - Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural selection. This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is essentially the projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.

When considering torture from the most basic, survival, level consideration of morality has no bearing upon the use of any method that ensures survival. The imperative is the continuation of the line, therefore, so long as the subject of the torture isn't of that line any method of information extraction is justified.

 

4GW Torture:

4GW - Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function effectively.

The use of torture at the fourth gradient is premised upon the creation of a sense of dread of the unknown in the minds of the opponent. Torture becomes a method not just of gathering information, but a weapon of fear. Used as an extreme, the opponent may have a fear of capture by the 4GW actor that prevents the opponent from orienting effectively, always considering most immediately the need to be able to escape rather than the most immediate method to execute their own doctrine. The morality of the use of torture at this gradient is ignored in the necessity of its utility to inspire fear.

 

5GW Torture:

5GW - Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect.

Torture at the fifth gradient takes on a different aspect from the use of torture at 0GW and 4GW. At those gradients the negative moral aspect of torture is either irrelevant or used to give torture utility. For 5GW the moral aspect of torture is the most important aspect. In most  (if not all cases) 5GW is a warfare of competing ideas and ideals. At the fifth gradient the least desirable outcome is to have your ideology linked to an overwhelmingly negative meme like torture either  through your own actions, or by the manipulation of an opponent that links torture to your ideology.

 

Do the Ends Justify the Means?

Calling it torture or "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" makes no difference, if a method is seen to be torture it carries a negative moral connotation. As it is argued above, for two of the three gradients this is either irrelevant or desirable, however, for 5GW the moral aspect is paramount. At the risk of editorializing, the United States of America is at its very core an expression of an ideology, an expression of connectivity and freedom and the ideal that all good things are possible with enough hard work and determination. As such, The United States of America in spreading that ideal must always approach any conflict or confrontation from the fifth gradient mind-set.  Because of that, the USA must never engage in a method or doctrine that has a negative moral aspect, and must always guard against an opponent's attempt to manipulate the USA into a morally negative action,  lest that negative meme be linked to the positive ideological foundation of the country.

For 5GW the means justify the end.

Cross posted at Red Herrings

 

The following is an attempt to categorize the principles behind the doctrines that comprise each gradient of the XGW framework. Please note that the XGW framework is not the Generations of Modern Warfare model described by Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton and Wilson in The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. The XGW framework is a descendant of that model and shares some characteristics such as the carryover of elements from one gradient to the next.

 

Other authors and thinkers whose ideas and concepts greatly contributed to this framework include, but are not limited to; Robert Leonhard, John Boyd, Thomas X. Hammes, Rupert Smith, Tom Barnett, Howard Bloom, Dan Abbot, Curtis Gale Weeks, ‘Purpleslog,’ and John Robb. I stand on the shoulders of giants.

 

Special thanks are owed to the commentators who through constructive argument and devil’s advocacy helped refine the framework into its current incarnation.

 

Introduction to the Framework

 

Premise of Conflict and Confrontation:

The XGW framework is based upon the concept of conflict and confrontation from General Rupert Smith’s The Utility of Force. The XGW framework addresses any instance where two or more actors come into conflict and/or confrontation be it physical, ideological or political.

 

Premise of Basic Principles:

Each gradient of XGW embodies the basic principle behind an expression of Force. This addresses not the ‘how’ but ‘why’ each gradient of doctrine functions as it does. Each gradient is intended to be broad and inclusive to account for all possible doctrines. The XGW framework is also intended to allow for new gradients to be created, accounting for doctrines that do not fit in any of the six existing gradients, 0GW through 5GW.

 

Kinetic and Non-kinetic Force:

The doctrines of the XGW framework embody expressions of Force both kinetic and non-kinetic In the XGW framework, kinetic Force has greater utility at lower gradients of the framework, and less utility at the higher gradients of the framework. This utility is mirrored by the utility of non-kinetic Force, which is lowest at the lower gradients of the framework and greatest at the highest gradients of the framework.

 

Technology:

Being premised upon base principles, the doctrines of the XGW gradients are effectively independent of technological innovation. In principle, a practitioner should be able to pursue any gradient of doctrine with any available technology.

 

Classification and Application:

The XGW framework is intended to have two separate but complimentary functions. The framework is first a guide to classify and understand the principle behind doctrines being employed by actors in any conflict or confrontation. Second, a practitioner should use the knowledge gained by this classification in order to devise doctrines that perform at a higher gradient than those being used by their opponent. This problem-solving process is expressed as x+1 where ‘x’ is the gradient of doctrine being used by an actor and ‘+1’ is the next higher gradient of doctrine. Each gradient of doctrine’+1’ possesses, in principle, an inherent advantage over doctrines of the previous gradient.

 

 

The XGW Framework

 

0 (Base) Gradient - Darwinian Warfare - 0GW

 

Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural selection. This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is essentially the projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.

Note: Howard Bloom argues in The Lucifer Principle that ideas/memes act in the same manner.

 

First Gradient - Cooperative Warfare - 1GW

 

Cooperative warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of creating organizations that require the individual to surrender control to the group in order to project Force to accomplish goals that are necessary to the survival of the group.

 

Second Gradient - Attrition Warfare - 2GW

 

The Principle behind attrition warfare describes doctrines that use the strength of the attacker to target the strength of the opponent.

 

Third Gradient - Maneuver Warfare - 3GW

 

Maneuver Warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of avoiding the strength of the opponent in order to attack the critical vulnerability of the opponent.

 

Note: The principles of 2GW and 3GW are informed mostly by the thinking of Col. Robert Leonhard’s books, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle, and The Principles of War for the Information Age. He bases these principles upon the concepts and writings of Sun-Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, John Boyd, William Lind, and B. H. Liddell-Hart, among others.

 

Fourth Gradient - Moral Warfare - 4GW

 

Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function effectively.

 

Fifth Gradient - Contextual Warfare - 5GW

 

Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect.

There are a few basic premises that should be included in any framework that attempts to differentiate between methods / doctrines / types / generations / gradients of warfare.

1) There must be an internally consistent progression of effectiveness displayed in the framework. For every type of warfare there is at least one corresponding type of warfare that exists to offset it. It may not yet exist or yet have a set theoretical definition, but it must be able to potentially exist and be able to be expressed on the continuum of warfare within the framework.

2) The types of warfare must be able to exist on any type of battlefield.

3) The framework must express an ability to categorize types of warfare in order to determine the position of a type of warfare on a continuum, and suggest the appropriate response to a type of warfare by showing on the continuum the counter to the type of warfare an opponent is employing.

4) Each type of warfare in the framework must be able to be clearly defined at each level of employment be it tactical, operational, strategic or grand strategic. Also, different types of warfare must be able to co-exist at each of these levels.

An Interesting puzzle for 5GW thinking. (Hat tip: Zenpundit)

Blog Tank: National Strategy for a Few Nuclear Weapons - Expanded

by Cheryl Rofer

"Andy at Nuclear Mangoes reminded me over the weekend of my irritation that nobody has addressed the strategy of one to a few nuclear weapons. That’s a different problem than something in the range of 5-10, which is a different problem from a higher number. None of these have been addressed systematically for today’s world.

So let’s have a blog tank. Anyone who wants to participate should post a scenario (or scenarios) on their blog or, if you don’t have a blog, in the comments to this post. Here is the problem I want to address:

What strategies are available to a country with fissionable material sufficient for 1-5 nuclear weapons, some of which may be assembled? Take into account probable responses, and assume some sort of rationality on the holders of these weapons and material. You may specifically refer to Iran and North Korea, or any other nation, or make the scenario(s) more general. Flesh out the scenario with some support."

 

My thinking is that it really isn't very cost effective for a country to build a nuclear program that provided only a few useable weapons, Once the infrastructure is in place an arsenal of a few dozen weapons would likely be possible as a country plays for time, betting that the program will reach maturity before international sanctions could ruin the country. From there it just becomes a question of the range of the possible delivery vehicles. In the event of military preemption before the program reaches its production goal, the existing weapons, if used, would most likely be used tactically, a situation that already has a well developed doctrine.

A more interesting scenario to me is what would happen if a nation or organization without a nuclear arms program should happen to find itself in possession of one to five nuclear weapons, a few former Soviet nuclear artillery shells for example. Perhaps through some sort of logistical error a few of these rounds made it into circulation in the Caucasus. Several countries militarily active in the region, including Russia, have 2S7 Pion self-propelled guns and / or 2S4 Tulip self-propelled mortars capable of firing 203mm and 240mm nuclear shells respectively. The yield of a slightly larger US weapon, the W19,  was 15-20 kilotons. Reportedly, Russian weapons had higher yields than their U. S. counterparts so this range seems a good ballpark for comparison and places it in approximately the same range as Little Boy and Fat Man, the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This gives these devices a very respectable amount of potential destruction to compliment the greatest possible asset for these weapons, their portability and size. Yes, these weapons are intended to be used tactically, but is it possible to craft a scenario to use them strategically?

This situation also suggests four different types of players (aside from the pure terrorist).

I have been meaning to write this for awhile. Zenpundit's mention of "Unrestricted Warfare" and 4GW/5GW got me to type it:

The ideas from URW haven’t quite made there way into 4GW/5GW…there is a lot of richness in the its ideas. There is more in URW then is in Lind’s 4GW. So, does that make URW a better source for 4GW, or just for how states might fight 4GW? There is a lot of 5GW-ish stuff in there to. Maybe URW concept should be distilled and and treat as a separate category in XGW.

I leaning toward the 4GW category being shorthanded as "Full Spectrum Conflict" with the 'Weaponization of things not thought to be weapons" being key.

Maybe it is best in XGW to treat URW as an additional generation between 4GW and 5GW though.

What do you all think?

I've thoroughly enjoyed the rich intellectual debate broiling this past month in the 'blogosphere over the construct of the "generational" model of warfare: from D5GW host Curtis Gale Weeks to co-contributors tdaxp (several posts and more) & General of the Hordes Subadei, Younghusband (twice) at Coming Anarchy, Smitten Eagle (channeled by Lexington Green), Fabius Maximus (who also critiqued a Friedman piece from STRATFOR), Arms and Influence, Stephen Pampinella (twice), and Skilluminati.

Much of these analyses focus on the implicitly ordinal nature of the "generational" model.  tdaxp's lucid post on "The Terminology of XGW" attempts to overcome this fundamental shortcoming in the model, but doesn't go far enough in jettisoning the troublesome implication.  His recommendation to abandon "generation" in favor of "grade" -- or, later, "gradient" -- still connotes an ordinal nature of the methods of warfare.

Recent efforts to diminish my "anti-library" (which have proven fruitless, since my propensity for borrowing books exceeds the rate by which I actually read and return them) has me deep into Karen Armstrong's outstanding biography, "Muhammad".  Early in chapter 1 ("Muhammad the Enemy"), Prof. Armstrong describes the 9th century monk Perfectus of Cordova, in Andalusia (née the capital of the Muslim state of al-Andalus).  His diatribe against the Prophet of Islam warranted a death sentence, and inspired dozens of others from all levels of society to similarly insult Muhammad -- and receive similar fates from the Qadi.

Perfectus, his contemporaries Eulogio and Alvaro, and the many other "Cordovan martyrs" had been influenced by an apocalyptic biography of Muhammad that (with extensive artistic liberties) linked the Prophet of Islam to the "Great Deceiver" predicted in the Apostle Paul's second epistle to the Thessalonians.  The association of Muhammad with the "... rebel [who] would establish his rule in the Temple of Jerusalem and mislead many Christians with his plausible doctrines" (2 Thes. 1:4-8, cited in Armstrong's Muhammad, p. 24), and with John's Book of Revelation through "selective addition" (claiming Muhammad died in the year 666 -- even though he lived another 38 years), were what we may call a "5th generation war": a secret war that exploited cultural icons in order to diminish and defeat an opponent.

My personal epiphany, while reading Armstrong in the midst of the ongoing 'blog dialog (diablog?), is that none of the "generational" models are necessarily exclusive -- nor for that matter are they strategic.  Rather, they are simply tactical methods that one may choose to apply in the achievement of an objective or the fulfillment of a task.

Consider George Friedman's recent STRATFOR analysis on Secretary Gates's dismissal of CSAF Mosely and SAF Wynne, where he describes the GMW put forth by Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton and Wilson in their groundbreaking 1989 Marine Corps GAZETTE article:

"There is a school of thought in the military that argues that we have now entered the fourth generation of warfare. The first generation of war, according to this theory, involved columns and lines of troops firing muzzle-loaded weapons in volleys. The second generation consisted of warfare involving indirect fire (artillery) and massed movement, as seen in World War I. Third-generation warfare comprised mobile warfare, focused on outmaneuvering the enemy, penetrating enemy lines and encircling them, as was done with armor during World War II. The first three generations of warfare involved large numbers of troops, equipment and logistics. Large territorial organizations — namely, nation-states — were required to carry them out.  ... Fourth-generation warfare is warfare carried out by nonstate actors using small, decentralized units and individuals to strike at enemy forces and, more important, create political support among the population.

Whether a commander chooses to align his forces in columns (a staple of "close order drill", one of the most basic elements of modern day "Basic Training" in the armed services), or to mass fires, or to exploit maneuver, or to focus on "creating political support among the population" as GEN Petraeus is doing with "the Surge", the fact of the matter is that ALL of these are valid tactics at some point.  In fact, I submit that the methods are force structure neutral in many respects -- albeit some force structures are optimized for certain methods. 

The crux of the matter is that warfare is no longer the sole purview of the nation-state.  The proliferation of information technologies and ready access to design "best practices" is collapsing the barriers to entry in the bazaar of violence, as John Robb has been telling us for some time.  Even seemingly advanced weapon systems like cruise missiles (the "rich man's IED") will soon become accessible to self-subsidized organizations with DIY ingenuity, GPS-enabled cell phones and a modicum of propellant and guidance.  And we have all seen the power of networks for manipulating and influencing perceptions.

While the nation-state is optimized for the first of Boyd's three "Categories of Conflict" (Attrition, Maneuver and Moral [q.v. Patterns of Conflict, p. 113, cited by Younghusband]), the latter two have very low barriers to entry and are readily accessible for nearly any size of organization.  And while I disagree with Kotare's dismissal of Clausewitz and the overarching aim of "breaking" an enemy's will, his emphasis on the tangible nature of "strategy" as a target of collective effort is compelling.

In closing, Curtis Gale Weeks's "Triangulation" of Clausewitz and Boyd offers a finite, n-space description of the ways by which an entity may seek to compel another.  His taxonomy, with three principal environments (rationality, probability and rage), three primary target sets (governance, military and population) and three categories of conflict (attrition, maneuver and moral) elicit 27 strategic permutations.  Perhaps rather than debating the merits of the individual yardsticks by which we measure any one of these metrics, we should rather be examining which of these permutations pose the greatest risk to our own strategies -- and guarding against them.

Recent discussions re: "GMW vs xGW" [1] [2] [3] suggest that William Lind's Generations of Modern Warfare model is insufficient and that the newer model xGW proves more useful for understanding warfare in our present era -- as well as in previous eras.

In point of fact, Lind's model has often caused dispute, particularly on the fourth tier, that is with regard to the prognostication of 4GW. Useful or not, the first three generations are descriptive of what has already occurred in our modern era and so are "pre-verified". The fourth generation is a guess of what is to come, which has been partly verified by current conflicts but was left open enough to suggest all future conflicts.

The fact that Lind's GMW leaves "fourth generation warfare" open to becoming whatever happens in the future -- the definition is vague and fluid enough -- severely limits the usefulness of GMW. What are we to learn from GMW that will benefit us, whether as a state or as individuals engaged in conflict? By leaving no room for the development of a "fifth generation of warfare" that could defeat a "fourth generation warfare", we are left no recourse in GMW except the ability to describe: Having described 1GW through 3GW, we come to "4GW" which we can use to tag all future events. What we are to do about those events doesn't matter and is conspicuously absent from the GMW model.

xGW, on the other hand, would seek to suggest a framework which would allow problem-solving. If we eject the word "generation" from the model and instead use something else, such as "grade" [2], and by so doing eject the most common connotations of "generation", we can perhaps begin to postulate not merely the styles of conflict as they emerge exterior to us, one after another, but also the relationship of these styles to one another in a useful manner: i.e., we may postulate an interior activity, or a reflective and prospective activity which becomes problem-solving. One force sees its opponent's activity, assesses itself, and seeks to develop a better method of fighting. For me, this is at heart the greatest strength of xGW.

This is why I have some difficulties accepting the most recent trend exemplified in the discussion under Arherring's latest post on Dreaming 5GW, "XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines." The post has received a lot of activity since it was added to the blog, quite a few visits. While I recognize the usefulness of having simple descriptions of 0GW-5GW (what I imagine to be its biggest draw), I would avoid encapsulating xGW as a merely descriptive model. A note: while the simple descriptions, though they could be improved, may be a necessary early step toward understanding and using xGW, the discussion there and even now elsewhere --

The advantage to Boyd’s categories is the ahistorical aspect — there is no chain of causality. As mentioned by Dan above, this is one of the biggest criticisms of xGW. I maintain that xGW should abandon the timeline altogether.

(Younghusband, Coming Anarchy)

-- which seeks to eliminate issues of causality by eliminating sequencing and temporal relationships would reduce xGW to a merely descriptive taxonomy. Looking back at a battle, whether 50 years back or 2000, we could call it 1st Grade Warfare or 4th Grade Warfare. We might see a 2GW force defeating a 4GW force, a 4GW force defeating a 1GW force, a 3GW force defeating a 5GW force, and feel secure that we were able to categorize these forces within potential categories; but be left in the present believing that quite possibly a 2GW force structure would be just fine for defeating whatever 4GW foes we face. And why not? If xGW is merely to be a system of categorization -- of label-making -- we would be freed to fight however we want without bothering to think much about xGW. xGW would not be terribly useful for guiding our decisions: a system of labels rather than a system for strategizing.

On the other hand, any system of strategizing must necessarily begin with a workable cognitive framework, which a system of description could provide.

Younghusband in the Coming Anarchy post suggested a return to John Boyd's Patterns of Conflict:

Categories of Conflict

Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we can imagine three kinds of human conflict:

• Attrition Warfare -- as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
• Maneuver Conflict -- as practiced by the Mongols, General Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler's Generals...and the Americans under Generals Patton and MacArthur.
• Moral Conflict -- as practiced by the Mongols, most Guerrilla Leaders, a very few Counter-Guerrillas...and certain others from Sun Tzu to the present.

These descriptions, I note, are not entirely different from Arherring's descriptive taxonomy; he even uses some of the same practitioners in his descriptions of 0GW-5GW. But what will distinguish the 3-pronged descriptive strategy of Boyd from the 6-pronged descriptive strategy Arherring used? (Note also that Arherring, by use of the numerals 0 - 5, suggests a progression, whether temporally linear or a linear progression of grades.)

In order for xGW to have any use whatsoever greater than the use of the GMW system, we must come to understand how xGW would move beyond the merely descriptive strategy to a proactive decision-making strategy. Merely enabling description of warfare pre-Peace of Westphalia will not do us any good. Furthermore, I would posit: we are not now needing to fight those medieval and ancient wars which have long been decided. I.e., our modern era concerns us far more; or, present conflicts. While understanding why certain strategies have succeeded or failed in the far past might be of some use, I do not know that we can use uniformitarianism to suppose that our present activities will succeed or fail for the same reasons. Only a belief in warfare entirely separated from other socio-economic political systems would support the theory that identical "types" or "grades" or "generations" of warfare, past and present, will have the same utility regardless of when they occurred or may occur.

I wonder, then, whether we should extend the xGW framework from the merely generic/descriptive taxonomy that would place all warfare within 6 grades, by supposing how the general types of conflict may operate differently in different environments -- and we might look to Clausewitz for a guide. Recent discussions have reminded me of an older discussion on Dreaming 5GW initiated by D5GW contributor Deichmans: "5GW in Clausewitz's Trinity":

I’d like to add another element to the foundation: the Clausewitzian “Trinity” (developed in Book II of Karl von Clausewitz’s magnum opus, On War). Clausewitz, in developing his famous assertion that “war is a continuation of politics by other means,” describes three core elements of any campaign:

• Rationality (of the state)
• Probability (in military command)
• Rage (of the population)

How do rationality, probability, and rage -- of the state, in military command, of the population -- triangulate with attrition, maneuver, and moral warfare? In very general terms, Clausewitz's Trinity gives a framework for the environment in which Boyd's Categories of Conflict must operate. In similarly broad terms, I would suggest that moral warfare, for instance, might have very different outcomes if it is directed to target the rationality of the state, the probability/chance faced by the military command, and the rage of the population. Similarly, attritive strategies may have more or less effect depending on the specific target. Finally, changes within the geopolitical and social structures, not to mention technological changes, might influence the environment sufficiently to make some targets more feasible than others, and thus some strategies of conflict more or less efficient.

For xGW to be useful, we need to understand how these various factors interrelate, and then we need to see the correlation of these factors within our present day.




[1] "5GW as the Event Horizon", tdaxp

[2] "The Terminology of xGW", tdaxp

[3] "XGW as a System for the Classification of Doctrines", Dreaming 5GW

I propose we say goodbye to such jargon as "Third Stage of the 4th Generation of War..."

The Term “Generation” Must Be Abandoned
Just as the abandonment of GMW (The Generations of Modern War) is a critical step in the evolution of XGW theory, the abandonment of “Generation” is the next step. Consider the many criticisms of “4GW” available on the web. Previously, proponents of XGW had to argue against these criticism, and assert that the critics did not really understand 4GW. Now, proponents can agree with the criticism, generalize them to criticism of GMW, and present XGW as an alternative.

I propose Grade, thus making XGW "X Grade War" Theory.

The rest of the entry is at tdaxp.

I posted this as part of a comment at TDAXP, part of an excellent discussion with several D5GW contributors and Smitten Eagle about the shape of XGW and its differences from the Generations of Modern Warfare (GMW). I'm posting it here so that I can possibly expand upon it and more easily refer back to it in the future.

0GW is the heading for genocidal/survival warfare. Individuals fight for themselves and for the right of their line to survive.

1GW encompasses projection of force to and from key geographical postions. The Spartans and Persians at Thermopylae is a good example of this as are the campaigns of Hannibal and many other battles from antiquity to modern times.

2GW covers doctrines of attrition, where force is used to degrade the physical ability of the enemy to oppose you by direct force. Agincourt is a prime example of this but so are many battles in the American Civil War, WW1 and WW2.

 

3GW is for doctrines that dislocate the strength of an enemy with a strike at the essential weakness of an enemy (2GW is strength on strength, and 3GW is strength on weakness). The German bypassing of the Maginot Line is an example of avoiding strength to attack weakness and displacing the enemy. This kind of displacement may be positional, temporal, material and/or moral. The Mongols were masters of this, so was ‘Stonewall Jackson’ and Erwin Rommel.

 

4GW makes the jump into the moral that 3GW starts. 4GW doctrines strike at the enemy’s perceived ability to continue fighting. Scorched earth is an example of 4GW in that even before an invader feels the pinch of not being able to provide for themselves from conquered territory (even if alternative supply can be arranged) they begin to feel unable to continue the fight in the face of such destruction and resolution.

5GW is even more subtle, it’s activity goes below perception into the context of conflict. What a target observes is manipulated in order to cause the target to react in a specific and completely natural manner.

 

Each of these Generations is, in effect, a dislocation of the previous Generation (X-1). The doctrines that fit into each of these Generations may exist concurrently with each other. A 5GW campaign may contain battles fought with 4GW, 3GW and 2GW doctrines and contain engagements of Generations 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. This is a strength of XGW.

I agree with Lexington's comment.  5GW as Event Horizon has it all: a well spoken skeptic, clear distinction between XGW and GMW, many D5GW contributors, and of course references to the Event Horizon.

Check it out.

It's been used at least twice in threads where I was active (here at Dreaming 5GW, and there at ZenPundit), but I just noticed Smitten Eagle's use of the term "GMW" to stand for William Lind's "Generations of Modern War" framework.  I think it's great that Lind's work has a TLA, and if we use "XGW" instead of "xGW," it makes a comparison between GMW and XGW easier to display in letters. 

The sooner that XGW can divorce itself from GMW the better.

Who gets the credit for the term "GMW"?

I should have expected it when I jabbed "public diplomacy", but Mountainrunner decided to seek revenge by ravaging generations of war theory. At least, he does so while donning the mantle of a William Lind literalist, apparently rejecting any deviation from the Lindian line as either an invalid formulation for xGW, or a rejection of xGW.

A quote.

To your point that "The generations of war are not emerging but are always present." That, sir, is not generational and goes back to one of my points against 4GW: its sequencing. The whole framework of 4GW is problematic and should be dismissed and/or punted. This part of the conversation speaks to your drinking the Kool-Aid ;)

Read the post: "Reactions to Bhutto."

Learn more about xGW: "The Generations of War without the Jargon."

Also on the web: "Categorization and the nature of science."

Überblogger ZenPundit has summarized a ten-part series by Fabius Maximus from Defense and the National Interest.  Though only posted about two hours ago, ZenPundit's post has already elicited feedback from FM, as well as myself and D5GW moderator Curtis Gale Weeks.

ZenPundit has underscored a crucial factor in the evolution of the "xGW" model: how does one discriminate between 4GW (culture-based asymmetrical warfare focused on the "rage of the people") and 5GW (perception-based warfare focused on the context of conflict)?

Recent posts here at D5GW (in particular ARHerring's "Left of Boom/Right of Boom" analysis of kinetics in xGW, and Curtis's "X vs. X" follow-up) describe interrelationship of the various "generations" -- key to any theoretical framework.

I'd like to add another element to the foundation: the Clausewitzian "Trinity" (developed in Book II of Karl von Clausewitz's magnum opus, On War).  Clausewitz, in developing his famous assertion that "war is a continuation of politics by other means," describes three core elements of any campaign:

• Rationality (of the state)
• Probability (in military command)
• Rage (of the population)

Much of the "Cold War" ethos of warfighting was vested in the first premise: the rationality of the state (q.v., "Mutually Assured Destruction" doctrine in nuclear warfare).  Similarly, insurgencies like the U.S. faced in Vietnam forty years ago -- and in Iraq today -- are driven by the third premise: the rage of the people.

Could 5th Generation Warfare (where perception and context are key) be described as a fusion of popular rage with political rationality, where the very idea of "conflict" is altered in order to create conditions favorable to the 5th Generation warrior?  Such a feat would logically factor the second premise (the probabilistic calculus of the military commander) out of the equation -- or at least reduce its relevance in the larger battle of ideas.

Reviewing my last post, "X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict", (which Dan tdaxp linked with kind words; thanks!), I wonder if the diagram ought to be updated.

I had used this diagram to show the generational conflict and general progression of generations, relating them to each other and to Boom:
Now I wonder if I should have tweaked the diagram one step further to better show the dispersal of kinetics/centers of gravity with the generational progression; like this:


This re-visioning has the added benefit of showing, to the left of Boom, the general progression leftward of each generation, so that the left/right relationship between the generations also appears vertically.  Where 3GW is "left of Boom" when in conflict with 2GW, it is also further left on the Left in relationship to 2GW.

This revised diagram also gives a visual representation to "dispersal."

In Dan's post, he offered a summarization of part of my previous post:

The tug of gravity weakens exponentially with the addition of each new dimension through which it may propagate.*

I wonder if we might use this revision of the diagram to add new dimensions to our understanding of the xGW model.  Specifically, I wonder if we might use the horizontal distance between competing generational strategies, as displayed in the diagram -- the increased dispersal of kinetics -- to come to a better understanding of the necessary time frames required for each new generational approach to win over the previous generational approach.

I.e., with the dispersal of kinetics and the multiplication of points of attack, perhaps "the tug of gravity" indeed weakens, necessitating longer time frames for victory.  No single kinetic attack can create victory, but many, many are required for the cumulative effect.  Then, we might see how a 4GW approach requires much longer to reach victory over 3GW forces than a 3GW force requires for defeating a 2GW force, for example.  5GW strategies, then, might indeed require a "Long War" when used to combat 4GW forces.




* edited to correct typos!

Arherring's intriguing reconceptualization of the xGW framework, "XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom", has inspired me to take my own route tying the concept of "Boom" to the generational model.

The term Boom, as I see it, describes the kinetics which occur during conflict.  We might borrow Arherring's phrasing and consider only the operative kinetics for each generation -- i.e., the type of kinetic activity which defines each generation, generation by generation, and through which each generation succeeds (or attempts to succeed), although many other kinetic activities may also occur -- because it is a valuable way of contemplating the generations and kinetic activity; but what if we simply lump all kinetic activity together and call it "Boom"?

Hidden within Arherring's diagram of the generations in relationship to Boom,is another which may describe each generation in relationship to the generation which precedes it and to the generation which follows it.  Arherring's approach may seem to leave the question of these relationships to the side; he has considered each generation in relationship to the Boom, and only from that consideration do we find some type of relationship between them.  I have attempted to include these intergenerational relationships in a revisioning of the diagram, or a redrawing, to add new dimensions.

A New Point of View on the Relationship Between Kinetic Action and XGW.

 

The Generations of Warfare model is most often viewed as a progression. The term 'generation' itself reinforces this, implying the process of one leading to another. As a result, many of the concepts we have studied in our explorations of 5GW in particular, and XGW in general, have their roots in this step-like or ladder-like point of view. A prime example is the consideration that each successive generation is specifically designed to circumvent the relative strength of the immediately previous generation. Another example of progression is the observation that the higher the generation of warfare used by an organization, the more generally dispersed the kinetic activity will be. This point of view contains a great deal of merit and shows consistent results and patterns that help theorists grasp the underlying truths the model contains. However, there are other ways to view XGW that can offer valuable insight.

 

A New Point of View:

 

Imagine a continuum in the form of a timeline. In the center of the timeline is a fixed point that represents kinetic action, or the 'Boom'. To the left of the Boom are events that influence the kinetic action. To the right of the Boom are events that are influenced by the kinetic action. When the operative actions, or the actions that embody the distinctions between each generation of XGW, are placed on the timeline relative to the Boom a very interesting and somewhat striking pattern seems to emerge.

A discussion is ensuing at Amicable Collisions involving the valuation and evaluation of the generational warfare model (xGW).  The post and the idea in question, "Political Activism as a Form of Warfare", were highlighted in my last post on D5GW.  Phil and Dan have been trading arguments, and I recently weighed in with the following comment, reposted here.  I would add that despite the mention of one type of relationship between the generations of xGW, meant for describing the usefulness of the model, other relationships may also exist which make the model very useful for discussions about warfare.


Phil,

The usefulness of the generational model is primarily in showing the sequence of emergence of different forms of war.

My primary quibble involves the use of "primarily" above, and also the term "sequence" which has a time-based connotation.

First, the generational model has much more usefulness than merely mapping out a timing-sequence. For instance, if we think of generation as a type of cause-effect relationshipping between the constituent parts of the model, then the model may be thought of as a way of restating how one generation "gives birth" to the next or motivates people to develop the next generation. This relationship is also very important, more important than the fact that a time-sequencing might seem to be implied.

And "sequencing" implies clean breaks between the generations; whereas, lots of holdover occurs between one generation and the next. This gets to the distinction between a clock-based concept of time, in which time can be neatly divided into separate units, and considering time as duration. (Hah, I'm channeling Bergson.) This implication of clean breaks also devalues the relationships between each generation.

The clean-break sequencing you are attacking is a kind of straw man, actually, although it's a popular straw man for those arguing that the xGW is limited. (The model may be limited, but not for the reasons you give.) For instance, your idea that a modern group has the option of using 2GW, 3GW, and 4GW in a 5GW world is a non sequitur simply because the assertion is built to controvert the idea that xGW belongs only at Time-A, followed in sequence by x+1GW which belongs only at Time-B, etc., with neat periods defined by whichever generation of warfare is being used. Whereas, we could just as easily say that 4GW helps to cause the generation of (development of) 5GW but does not bear that same exact relationship to 2GW; and, 2GW does not bear the same generation-al relationship to 5GW that it bears to 3GW. They can all exist at the same time, however.

---

[Addendum:  Incidentally, I accidentally removed this post earlier Monday after publishing it! Don't know how that happened, exactly. So now it's back up.]

A couple of recent links to D5GW:

Phil at Amicable Collisions linked our Soros post with "Political Activism as a Form of War."

While I do not agree that the only use for an xGW model is "primarily in showing the sequence of emergence of different forms of war", the idea that the linearity implied by the generational model may be inaccurate for describing different types of conflict is one that has been expressed often, more often recently than ever before.  Phil makes a very interesting point that save for 1GW, the previous generational styles continue to be viable options for anyone wanting to engage in conflict, and also that choices will depend upon the prevailing conditions for any particular conflict:

So the sequence of emergence over time is irrelevant. Today we can wage the forms of war identified in the generational model as 2G, 3G, and 4G, but not 1G. With the exception of 1GW the emergence of the succeeding generations did not make the previous generation obsolete, rather they gave war-fighters more options for waging war in different circumstances and for different purposes.

That may be a new spin on the xGW theory but is not altogether new, since even Lind argued that many features of succeeding generations are holdovers from previous generations.  A qualitative shift is not a complete break; then, would the possibility arise that whatever innovation defines x+1GW might occasionally be unnecessary in some conflicts, leaving the fighter fighting with x+1GW that just happens to look largely like xGW (in a particular conflict)?

I have been using the term conflict so far, because several of the more prominent (!?) theorists now contemplating the xGW model have long folded into their considerations the idea that politics has emerged as an important component of warfare.  Quite possibly, politics has always been a component of warfare, but to the degree that socio-economic demands have forced would-be fighters to abandon the highly kinetic, in intensity and/or focus, methods, "politicking" has inherited some of that intensity and focus.

A socio-economic influence might be the relative lack of a large economic infrastructure for some 4GW fighters -- thus demanding styles of fighting which are asymmetrical -- or else a general public squeamishness over the use of force for resolving conflicts.  Interestingly, these can go hand in hand, with one force using asymmetrical kinetic attacks against another force that must tip-toe around the use of kinetics due to some squeamishness on their side of the system:   not only does the squeamishness prevent a symmetrical response, it produces the result desired by the asymmetrical warrior when he places kinetics front-and-center for the squeamish public's viewing.

Phil introduces this idea of a shift toward the political arena and extends it:

As this phenomena continues to evolve, what would, in the past, have been wars fought with armies will be conflicts fought through non-violent political activism, without a battlefield component at all.

This idea is one I've brushed before:  that 5GW may ultimately become socio-political conflict, alone, although such a dynamic is far from actualization at present:

...is it possible that this is the desired paradigm?  I.e., 5GW conflict in which few die but some rise while others fall, unbeknownst to the majority, in largely non-violent conflicts?

["Dreaming 5GW: In Surround Sound"]

When I consider the possibility that "5GW will be the last generation of war" -- as I've only recently written for all to see, this is the sort of thing I have in mind (but not the only thing!)


Phil folds the preceding considerations together to wonder, first, whether such entirely non-violent conflict should be called "war" -- an oldish question for many of us -- and, second, whether we ought to take a closer look at political activism, perhaps with an eye for distinguishing different types of political activism, similar to the way we discuss xGW for warfare.
Dan tdaxp, A.E., Thomas Barnett, and I myself have contemplated different types of political maneuvering that might fit the bill; but Phil's call is very interesting for the fact that he would eschew the xGW framework, and any consideration of the styles described by the theory of generational warfare, and look at politics itself.  I.e., whereas the aforementioned theorists find a place for politics in xGW, as if politics is merely one tool of warfare, Phil calls for a better understanding of political activism simply because politics is apparently becoming a primary method for resolving conflict.

What if the prognostications are correct and we find ourselves in a world in which 5GW has fully come into being, nearly eliminating large-scale violent activity for resolving conflict?  If politics in the broad scale (including media, entertainment, blogs, social networks, etc.) becomes the style of conflict, might we benefit from a more thorough understanding of the various ways such conflict may be conducted? [Incidentally, that last question has me suddenly remembering PurpleSlog's recent post elsewhere...particularly also a comment made there by Colin.  Linked again below.] Even if that actualized ideal 5GW dynamic takes its time in coming, a better understanding of political maneuvering may greatly help us to understand what makes us win or lose other styles of conflict.

---

Kent's Imperative has linked the 5GW Theory Timeline, a post at PurpleSlog, and Shlok Vaidya's blog with "Intelligence for the sixth generation warfighter."

A frequent theme at Kent's Imperative is this: What of intelligence?  The assumption is first made, accurately I think, that much old-style intelligence gathering and analysis is and will be inadequate; then, that we must consider how the intelligence community must adapt to the present and the future world.  A recurring theme at the blog.  Adapting to the future world now may be a problem, for reasons given in the linked entry.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb is paraphrased by Kent's Imperative:

In this, we would crib Nassim Nicholas’ Taleb’s analogy that in order to predict current events in Mesopotamia from the perspective of the Neanderthal, one has to understand the invention of the wheel first, and every subsequent technological and social change after - an impossible task, given that if one has the knowledge to predict an innovation one usually has the concept required to build it sooner rather than later.

You would think, perhaps, that I would have great affinity with Taleb, given my moniker here ("The Skeptic") and Taleb's introduction of himself at the last link:

"My major hobby is teasing people who take themselves & the quality of their knowledge too seriously & those who don’thave the guts to sometimes say: I don’t know...."


Perhaps I do.  However, I have often said that a true skeptic must also be skeptical of his skepticism!  I.e., even skeptics can be dogmatists.  (I hope you'll contemplate that koan.)

While adding entries to the Timeline, I came across one from ZenPundit that contained an argument that I had forgotten:  "5GW Reloaded: Reflecting on 5th Generation War Concepts".  Mark suggested as much as Kent's Imperative:

I do have an important caveat in pondering Dan's excellent 5GW work. What he and other commenters have or may have discerned about 5GW is less than what 5GW will comprise when it is fully realized and a generational shift in warfare has taken place. We have to hold out the possibility that "attacking the enemy's intellectual strength" and secrecy as proposed by Dan and my "longitudinal vision-short execution" and "shaping the battlespace" may end up be less significant than aspects of 5GW that have yet to materialize. Societal shifts by 2050 or 2080 are likely to be sizable - perhaps more extreme than the changes that occurred from 1860 to 1945 - and these shifts will produce new advantages and conditions that may favor defense over offense.

I would say, instead, that the Neanderthal may have safely predicted that humans would still kill humans in 2007.

One thing I have only once written on the blogosphere while discussing 5GW (I think it's only been one time), and only in passing, is something I'd propose now.  Arherring and others have been adamant about ruling out the advent of new technologies as a driver of generational shift, while yet others have based their concepts of xGW largely on the technology available to any given era or force.  I am ambivalent vis-a-vis that dichotomy.  I believe that technology is certainly an enabler of conflict, and I am certain that those who fought only with their hands, feet, and teeth most generally fought differently than those who threw stones, used sharp sticks and spears, and fought on horseback, etc. This is common-sensical, and I am often amazed that it is dismissed from some theories.  xGW must take into account everything in existence at the time of conflict, whether some things are broadly addressed and others take center stage.  Let me propose this:  that the preeminent weapon of 5GW -- the preeminent tool for conducting 5GW -- will be the human.  That is a tool that has only dimly been understood, which accounts for the sloppy use of it pre-5GW.  But 5GW will refine its use.

I suppose the tool can change, or be changed in the future, with various modifications made; but I also suppose that as long as humans are human, there will not be a generation after 5GW.  I dismiss for now contemplating the advent of intelligent machines that were never human and any conflict with intelligent extraterrestrials.

Newt wants his Long War to be a shorter, Big War, but the reality is that the integration processed cannot be magically sped up. Globalization's spread and impact is way beyond our control at this point in history. We will deal with many small wars that it unleashes, but we can't bundle them all up into a single notion. We're no longer in that unitary state world, but a networked one that gets built one node at a time.

Petraeus effort is seminal and does show the way. There's just no shortcutting history with a rousing call to arms.

In short, we should be exploring what 5GW means, not adding 1GW + 2GW + 3GW = 4GW.

-- Thomas P.M. Barnett, September 11, 2007.

So, Tom, explore.  Perhaps it's time for another personal dream of 5GW...(or at least an update?)

Following up on comments left in a previous D5GW post, Nonpartisan of Progressive Historians has asked his readers,

Isn't it possible that warfare doesn't move in a teleological direction at all, but that rather we're facing "armies" that are using techniques so primitive that we can no longer comprehend or guard against them? (link)

I've already added my comments!

(Also looks like I've become one of those readers!)