One of my earliest thoughts on 5gw was regarding conspiracy theories:
A 5GW operation will create conditions and contingencies to avoid detection by hiding among the crazies. I can see where parts of an operation might purposely be exposed and then linked with false information and crazy theories to discourage real investigation. All of this is aimed at the observation part of the OODA loop of the opponent.
Blogger Shrinkwrapped is a Psychiatrist and wrote this recently on Conspiracy Theories (but not directly on 5GW):
Human beings are prone to believe in nonsense. We typically find ways to use our rational thinking to support our nonsense theories, and usually the nonsense we believe in is harmless so long as it doesn’t interfere with our ability to work, love, and play (to use Freud’s old descriptor’s of mental health.) In The Value of Conspiracy Theories I described a relatively harmless conspiracy theory that is ascribed to by perhaps 40% of our British friends. JFK conspiracy theories have been a staple of the American zeitgeist for 45 years and have spawned a cottage industry and made many people quite wealthy. In these cases, the conspiracy theories reinforce some people’s existing anxiety about government and also reinforce the comforting idea that life is not completely random. Even if the “they” who are in control are evil, it is a comfort to know someone is in control and knows what is going on.
Other conspiracy theories are extraordinarily damaging to the holder. Those conspiracy theories are the ones that support the holder’s view that he or she is the victim of circumstances, forces, and people that are much more powerful than they, are inimical to them, and are beyond their control. Those beliefs lead to passivity and anger, and away from self reflection and responsibility.
Back in 2006 Shrinkwrapped wrote this on the subject:
For the non-psychotic, conspiracy theories can offer the same kind of balm. Our world is increasingly chaotic. At its best we experience the world rushing into the future sweeping us along in a rapidly changing dynamic equilibrium; those of us who are most adaptable can surf the bow front of the wave of change; many more are able to follow along just past the crest, but for those who have less agility, such rapid change is disorienting and anxiety producing. Because of the increasing complexity of the modern world we all are constantly at the mercy of strangers. We rely on strangers to keep our electric flowing and our lights on; we rely on strangers to get food to our markets and onto our tables; we rely on strangers not to kill us through inadvertence or malfeasance. We depend on strangers stopping at red lights! In such a complex world, we are as out of control as the most primitive and superstitious Caveman, whose life was at the mercy of events both large (storms, lightning bolts, earthquakes and tsunamis) and small (smilodons, infections, broken bones). In such a terrifying world, our anxiety leads us to imagine that some all-powerful individual (at one time thought to be God, but he has been devalued by modern, secular sophisticates who keep themselves unaware of the primitive nature of our minds) or individuals, are actually in control.
A random world is not only terrifying but poorly comprehensible; a world controlled by secret cabals of Jews, Americans, the CIA, multinationals, or some other nefarious grouping, may be frightening, but at least it is understandable. That Princess Diana, loved by so many, could be killed simply by the random vicissitudes of existence is too disturbing to contemplate. How much better to imagine she was killed by powerful, hidden forces? If the world is filled with uncertainty, we are all at risk; if there are hidden cabals controlling the world, we can feel safer by either staying out of their sights, or by attacking them as the cause of our problems. Either way, we can feel less anxious and uncertain.
Nonsense contaminates and warps the observational ability of an actor. A 5GWer can make use of that.
Update: Münzenberg at Soob has a thoughtful post with a different PoV that is worth reading.
-- or "Networks Redux".
Whereas network theorists often begin with the assumption that definite pathing can be observed, assessed, and defined when studying social systems, I began with a look at the way individuals operate and interact and the resulting emergent systems.
Network theorists may believe definitive ‘networks’ exist connecting these individuals, but in so doing they often make the mistake of believing that what they have discerned to be stable routes and routings — i.e., networks — can be understood to exist regardless of the individuals using those paths. I.e., to define a network is to believe that such interaction between individuals is prefigured by the available routes of data transmission.
Furthermore, a corresponding faith in perpetual and definable concrete connection often lies behind the frameworks posited by network theorists. Connectivity is assumed to exist between persons who interact, yes, but such connectivity is thought to be resilient, perpetual, and largely unchanging (at least for a short duration, but often assumed to last for longer durations.)
Important point though - "network" IS not an analogy or a metaphor as they relate to human social networks. They are an actual network subject to the same rules as a network on a smaller, nonhuman, scale.
These network theorists may finally be realizing that so-called networks do not lead to the emergence of activity so much as that activity leads to the emergence of networks — and that these actual connections are transitory, ephemeral, constantly changing. Any established ‘network’ may in fact be merely a fossilized account of activity rather than an ongoing account of real activity. We must not equate the architecture with the activity, because they are separate things.I wonder if the old "connection" is a prime example: The link I used when I originally quoted information about the report no longer leads to that item! "Page not found". And of all things, the site is called, "The Cooperation Commons"! Perhaps the item has shifted to somewhere else....*
[CGW]
* Note: The link to the article reviewing Bar-Yam's findings no longer works, but the paper itself, "From Centrality to Temporary Fame: Dynamic Centrality in Complex Networks", can still be found: link to pdf. The opening introduction includes:
“Local hubs” have a power law degree distribution over time, with no characteristic degree value. Our results imply a significant reinterpretation of the concept of node centrality in complex networks, and among other conclusions suggest that interventions targeting hubs will have significantly less effect than previously thought.
--which should interest those who contemplate security issues for the future.
As I wrote over at tdaxp, Both Rosenberg & Hovland (1960, 3) and Triandis (1971,3) break down attitudes into three components: cognitive (what people believe), affective (what people feel), and behavioral (what people do). The chart used to illustrate this troika is reproduced below:
Schematic Conception of AttitudesHowever, it strikes me this model can be rationalized if we look at how explicit an attitude is. For instance, cognitive attitudes rely entirely on what people verbally think, while behavioral attitudes might not even reflect what people feel.
Dotted Boxes are Intervening VariablesYet, I look at this and I think it should tie in somehow to the generations of war and the OODA loop:
But no matter how hard I try, I can't make a mapping (even if I add extra attitude components, like "existential," "observational," etc). Any suggestions?
Bibliography:
Rosenberg, M. J., & Hovland, C. I. (1960). Cognitive, affective, and behavioral components of attitudes. In M. J. Rosenberg, C. I. Hovland. W. J. McGuire, R. P. Abelson, & J. W. Brehm (Eds.), Attitude organization and change: An analysis of consistency among attitude components (pp. 1-14). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Triandis, H. C. (1971). Attitudes and attitude change. New York: Wiley.
(tdaxp's note: This is a cross-post of 'Orientation and Action, Part II: The OODA-PISRR Loop.' That article is one of two sequels for 'Go Deep,' my very first post on 5GW. 'Go Deep' is now split up into Orientation and Action, Introduction: On War Since John Boyd and Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop. The other sequel to 'Go Deep,' 'Dreaming 5th Generation War,' is the post for which this group blog is named.)
The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop of John Boyd is not only a model of human cognition.
It is also useful in aligning the generations of modern war within the framework of human cognition
Likewise, the broader Observe-Orient-Decide-Act/Penetrate-Isolate-Subvert-Reorient-Reharmonize Social loop is not only a model of social cognition
Both of these findings can be synthesized by viewing the generations of modern war within the framework of social cognition.
Consider that the second generation of modern war (2GW), based on concentrate of firepower, is the strong-suit of the state in war. Likewise, consider that the fourth generation of modern war (4GW), based on idelogical coherency, is the strong-suit of the insurgent in war.
From this we can place the third generatin of modern war (3GW), based on mobility, in between the state's and the insurgent's spheres of influence.
And this makes sense. In Patterns of Conflict, John Boyd describes maneuver warfare as "blitz/guerilla."
(One might just as easily as say "Global Guerrilla / Panzer General")
There are two remaining generations of modern war, and both fall outside the realms of the state and non-state. The first generation (1GW), built on total mobilization, was designed for states able to conscript a large fraction of the male population but unable to communicate effectively enough to effective combine firepower. Thus we place 1GW to the left of 2GW, as belonging to an actor which we would describe as a state... almost. (Compare the workings of Napoleonic France to that of a modern state to see how a 1G "state" falls short.)
Likewise, place the fifth generation of modern warfare (5GW) to the right of 4GW. 5GW is the domain of non-states... almost. When a 5GW is used by a state, it's actually the province of a "state within" that acts as an internal insurgency. The Military-Industrial-Complex devised by President Truman is the work of such a 5GW conspiracy-within-the-state.
Blue Circle encompasses the Realm of the State Red Circle encompasses the Realm of the Non-State
The take-away from this visualization is as follows:
Thanks to Ryan Luke of Social Engage, and of course my co-authors on this blog, for the questions and criticisms that made this post possible.
Interesting little reference found in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy that has 5GW overtones:
Molina, Luis de (1535--1600). Jesuit theologian and philosopher, born in Cuenca, Spain. He studied and taught at various leading Iberian universities. Molina is best known for his doctrine of middle knowledge (scientia media), expounded in Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis (1588). This doctrine's aim was to preserve human free will while maintaining the Christian doctrine of the efficacy of divine grace. For Molina, although God has foreknowledge of what human beings will choose to do, neither that knowledge nor God's grace determine human will. Middle knowledge, God's knowledge of what persons would do under any set of circumstances, enables God to arrange for certain human acts to occur by pre-arranging the circumstances surrounding a choice without determining the human will. God's grace is concurrent with the act of the will and does not predetermine it, rendering the Thomistic distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace superfluous.
[Prof. Jorge J.E. Gracia, State University of New York, Buffalo, and Elizabeth Millán.]
Not long ago, in a post brainstorming about the OODA and 5GW, I remarked,
While trying to grasp the concept of an iterative development process, I ran into this difficulty: in a parallel development process like those already mentioned, each distinct group of actors, however diverse, may be working toward shared or very similar goals — may recognize useful innovations made by others, as well as the failures of others — and so, in an open-source environment, each group’s operation appears to be one iteration of an iterative process spanning that environment, viewed from afar. In an open-source environment, the distinction between a parallel development process and an iterative development process may blur or fade altogether.
At any rate, today in bouncing around the blogs that encompass my suggested daily allowance I came across this post at MountainRunner ... and got to thinking that either MR has accidentally presented another sliver of theoretical gold regarding 5GW or I've simply erroneously perverted his post to suit my own means.
[Soob]
To wit, 5GW isn't necessarily a conglomerative effort but an individual effort.
[Soob]
5GW transcends even the most dynamic 4GW event in that it can non-kinetically originate, manifest, mature, afflict and intellectually conscript the same culture from which it originates.
[Soob]
Emerson saw the OODA, even if he did not call it that. Our actions are intimately related to 1) our observations and 2) our understanding of what we observe. Change the understanding, and you change the activity. Change the observations, and you may (but may not) change the understanding.
Emerson took it further than the individual OODA, however, or would draw a larger circle by considering the entire system of human pursuits. Culture is something that each person may have; but it is also something that individual persons may share, as individual OODA loops operate together in a system.
[CGW]
I've been doodling with the OODA again, trying to use the imagery to better understand 5GW. I'll put the doodles and comments below the fold, because they are image-intense when considered together (kb) and I don't want to make the main page of D5GW load sluggishly for any visitors still on dial-up.
This post is more about brainstorming than anything else, after a recap. So follow the storm...
A common theme, or call it a common question, frequently resurfaces in our little neck of the Blogospheric Woods, amazingly emergent wherever the discussion turns toward an examination of the future of humanity: Shall there be tribes; if so, will they be networked or largely insular; or does globalization ultimately eliminate any sort of identifiable tribalism? Discussions inspiring these question often range from topic to topic which themselves remain insular (they are not always considered together), and the definitions we use are often obscured or fuzzy. We do not always agree on terms. Unfortunately, our disagreement means that our attempts to come to some mutual understanding of the relevant issues are often also fuzzy, if not entirely hostile in an incoherent way.
One such fuzzy term requires further analysis: "primary loyalties."
A flurry of posts and comments have swarmed the generally closed-source development of Global Guerrilla Theory, whether to attack it or in support of it -- depending on who is writing. My various comments on the recent threads will seem like an attack; but they are malicious only to the degree that any Pyrrhonist exploration of the relevant ideas behind a theory may seem to reject out of hand the most dogmatic principles, treating them with the sort of disdain that dogmatists cannot appreciate: What seems contrary must be attacked as unfit, if only to further the search for better understanding, and dogmatists tend to take umbrage with any suggestion that their theories admit of doubt.
The most pointed posts attacking the questions raised by GGT can be found on TDAXP:
While I delay the writing and posting of the second part in my series on Static, Transparency, and Systemic Resilience, new sparks that appear to address the subject of static have surfaced or resurfaced: whether in my own mind or elsewhere, or both, they deserve at least a perfunctory post. Besides, these sparks will relate to the subject of Part Two of that series, transparency.
The significance of EBO is simply this: that, despite superstitious belief in metaphysical acts that can directly change the physical world, all our actions upon the world are physical in nature, and any effort toward a concrete goal vis-a-vis warfare must therefore be conducted by physical means. That goal is the effect we wish, upon which we base our operations as we strive toward it. In other words, "An effects-based approach is a common-sense and intuitive way to conduct operations," as explained by Sonny at FX-Based.
The limitations of EBO are of two natures, both of which are concrete although one also takes into account the objective reality of subjectivity:
It's just that cause and effect are omnipresent, the World is complex, and Observations -- whether concrete or abstract -- are going to be limited, stretching from the past through the present and into the future. Thus, reason is limited.[CGW, Dreaming 5GW, "EBO is Everything in War -- Almost"]
Dan of tdaxp has previously utilized John Boyd's OODA Loop to gain a better understanding of William Lind's framework for the generations of warfare, in a post called "Go Deep (OODA and the Rainbow of Generational Warfare)." In that post, Dan considered primarily the part of the abstract, or subjective, cognitive process most targeted by each generation of warfare, shown here in an image modeled on his but using a closer approximation to Boyd's Loop:
1GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy's ability to decide and act....2GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy's ability to orient and decide....
3GW is defined by conflict centered around an enemy's ability to orient....
4GW is defined by conflict centered around Observe and Orient....
[Dan, tdaxp, "Go Deep"]
First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors -- the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc....Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear....Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed manpower....Technological factors included von Moltke's realization that modern tactical firepower mandated battles of encirclement and the desire to exploit the capabilities of the railway and the telegraph....
Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower....Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics.... the addition of a new technological element--tanks--brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to time....
[Lind, "The Changing Face of War" emphasis added.]
Dan of tdaxp, in explaining his determination of where on the simple OODA each generation of warfare sought to "attack" an enemy's decision-making process, also included brief considerations of the observational capabilities of both attacker and target:
[1GW] Information was relatively symmetrical -- precise locations of either army were unavailable to any commander, while general knowledge of the land was known to all commanders....Unfortunately, Dan's consideration of these factors is rather brief in that linked post, as are Lind's considerations (in his linked essay) of the effect of technology on the generations of warfare. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, our conscious Acts are shaped by our reasoning, which in turn has been limited by our Observation of the World, and I would like a closer look at the way observational capabilities have altered effects-based approaches over time.[2GW] You know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly where you are going to die (in the razorwire and minefield, hit by enemy crossfire). Thanks to telegraphs and modern communications, commanders are flooded with a tsunami of almost meaningless facts. Thinking now centers around where and when it makes sense to try to break through, as well as the how to move to advance evenly....
[3GW] Victory in 3rd Generation Wars required the ability to instill madness -- to mess with the enemy's minds.... [ed. -- i.e., not only knowing roughly where you and the enemy are, but knowing the enemy's orientation beyond the simple bi-polar trench-line or strict front warfare, or knowing nodes and connections between individual units and battle placements, and being able to insert oneself quickly amidst that orientation via "blitzkrieg" maneuvers.]
[4GW] If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads [ed. -- observes, among other things] everywhere yet regular armies have a hard time even finding battles....
[5GW] A 5th Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever was a war.
[Dan, tdaxp, ibid.]
While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability -- reconnaissance capability -- than Dan's brief assessment allows, one's own scouts or the spies in an enemy's encampment would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report. In the first place, their reports would have been old news by the time they were received by one's generals -- perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity; perhaps days old if movement from the enemy forces to one's own force (to report) required days. Individual movements on the battlefield once battle had commenced would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-man, making the scout relatively useless. Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still be targeted, and targeting elements behind the enemy lines -- or beyond the range of those weapons -- would have been relatively useless. In the case of limited long-range capabilities, the targeting mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough if the cannonball or shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line.
2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range communications, and rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach. Primitive air forces also increased, and sped up, observational capabilities. Greater fire power in artillery and aerial bombings meant that one could more accurately target more enemies whenever one used these things (unlike, say, a cannonball in the previous generation that might have hit nothing when it fell or only one or a handful of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually helped limit the need to know an exact enemy placement.)
3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities -- a necessary improvement if one is to know where one's enemy is, exactly, and how that enemy's forces and strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most effectively to disrupt and overcome that enemy's defenses. Again, improved air forces, communications technologies, transportation, and firepower improved one's observational range and speed. Keeping one's own forces in contact, and operating efficiently and not at cross-purposes, also required quicker communications and observational capabilities.
4GW continues the trend. The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors even as I type this. Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and the net of media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data, increasing observational capability. Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists are often quite separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society, but they have yet to infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies' forces; i.e., be among those forces without being detected. (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi defense forces has somewhat occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi government has also occurred at some level. But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces or government? Unlikely, although the theft of databases -- such as the recently-stolen armed forces personnel database -- and intercept communications might give 4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S. operations. Or else, the New York Times will boldly publish details of those operations.)
5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as I've theorized, might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently available to 4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a society's armed forces, and a society's institutions and government, or else open communication of intentions from proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that they are being so used.
Furthermore, a consideration of these generations of warfare should not forget to look at the way other aspects of society beyond technology have developed across the years. For instance, at a time when many societies were organized on the basis of land-ownership rather than interstate commerce and trade, they tended to be insular (as well as self-sufficient), and an individual stranger was more quickly identified by differences in physical appearance and language, while an enemy state's operations were occluded by distance and their own insularity. As interconnectivity has increased, flows of information have increased in number; but while these increased flows of information have improved observational capabilities vis-a-vis enemy state activity, they have also multiplied factors to be considered, creating a complexity that may blind us, particularly when trying to distinguish individual enemy operatives. (That last may be applied particularly to the theory of 5GW, but these considerations may also touch significantly upon 4GW and even 3GW tactics.)
In each of these cases, a force's ability to observe its opponent enables or disables types of action available to that force, by allowing or disallowing a more complete and accurate orientation in relationship to that enemy and, thus, better decision-making ability.
Because greater observational capability may lead to successful "deeper" actions against an enemy, that enemy may be forced to adjust his decision-making process in reaction to those "deeper" acts. Essentially:
I've looked deeper into the subject of EBO -- in "EBO is Everything in War -- Almost" -- to better come to grips with how, indeed, we may act in warfare to create beneficial effects. And, I've found limits to EBO, which I've outlined in more detail at the beginning of this post.
Essentially, causes and reasons are two separate things, although colloquially we tend to equate them. But though different, they bear a relation to one another. To say that any action we may commit in warfare can cause a person to decide and act a certain way may miss the distinction between cause and reason -- some other subjective thought, or more likely many thoughts, about the present concrete environment or even a past concrete environment, could well be the primary foundation upon which an enemy chooses to act -- but nonetheless, we reason from the concrete. If we change the concrete world, our enemy may well be forced to reason from it, if only partly from it.
We can view an enemy's Acts to get a better, perhaps more objective, understanding of that enemy's abstract processes. Human acts are the physical manifestations of these abstract processes. To the degree that we can form a true understanding of an enemy's abstract processes, we may present him with information likely to run the course of his abstract processing in ways that will lead to beneficial acts -- beneficial to us.
But even given the possibility that we can somewhat objectively come to understand an enemy's thought processes, the World is complex, with much information feeding into our own and our enemy's Abstract OODA beyond our direct control. The World has always been complex, but we are only now, in modern times, beginning to appreciate the level of complexity. In my second post in this series, I commented on a contemporary superstitious belief in metaphysical acts by referencing
the superstitious theory that we are all somehow "connected" via a "network" and able to act upon each other metaphysically or outside the realm of physics... [CGW]and although I stand by the description, I recognize the difficulty inherent in assessing the current shape of human affairs in toto. We speak of such complexity in the shorthand when we refer to "networks" -- but it is a shorthand with some basis in concrete fact, I am sure. If cause and effect are indeed omnipresent in the concrete world -- another claim from that post -- then everything might truly be connected, perhaps in multiple ways and through mulitple chains of relation but affecting everything else in a very concrete manner. I'm just not able to suggest with sincerity that human beings are able to consciously affect everything or even anything through the same all-connecting tissue. (Except, we tend to connect everything we observe abstractly by finding a place for each thing in our general world-view.) Plus, the omnipresence of cause and effect, in combination with the complexity of the concrete World, may well mean that our physical acts, though minutely directed or focused on only part of the world, change parts of the concrete world we are as yet incapable of seeing in any present situation: that is the Butterfly Effect so commonly touted.
Given these considerations, and notwithstanding the perhaps futile process of simplifying the complexity to gain a better understanding of complex human interactions, I've attempted to overlay the "generations of warfare" onto the Revised OODA presented in Part One of this series:
Some notes on this diagram:
Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon. ["The Changing Face of War"]and from the consideration, outlined above, that 1GW attempted to affect the enemy's decision-making process primarily by destroying that enemy, or by altering the physical environment, without as much consideration for the abstract processes of that enemy. To change the World was the attempt at forcing a decision and an action -- surrender or retreat, etc. -- but this is still not the type of utter destruction of all enemy units that would be beyond the scope of EBO.
In fact, we will likely find that habitual acts tend to occur most often when quite familiar situations occur frequently; i.e., when physical Observation of the World quickly matches up with whatever Mental Constructs we have previously formed -- and, thus, not requiring further contemplation or hypotheses.The process of "helping" an enemy to form particular understandings of the world would lull the enemy into repetitive thought processes greatly informed by those Mental Constructs, and thus into reflexive or habitual acts. 1GW and 2GW, because they depend more on changed New Information for influencing an enemy's decision-making process (and less on "operational art" -- as termed by Lind -- if at all) do not focus as much attention on the creation of repetitive thought processes.
Three last notes.
First, although I believe that 3GW still has great utility -- technological advances may easily allow a force to impede a foe's ability to Decide (and thus, to act in any way but impulsively) -- the ability of any future 4GW or 5GW attacker to strike deeply into a 3GWarrior's homeland may be quite significant, given the processes of globalization well under way. John Robb's Global Guerrilla theory may or may not be 3GW; if 3GW, it is merely the GG's ability to strike deeply and quickly, confusing enemies by overloading Orient, on a scale unlike anything we've yet seen from 3GW. Technological advances developed for use by individual operatives, such as nanotechnology or even new uses for biological, chemical, or nuclear warfare on such a localized scale, may make GG's or their equivalents the epitome of quick-moving 3GW forces able to paralyze a foe. ("3GW infantry forces".) 4GW forces and even 5GW forces may also be able to use these technologies to strike deeply and quickly into a typical 3GW state's homeland. I'm less sure that a 3GW state will be able or even likely to attack another 3GW state effectively, save though a much superior technological advantage: too much observational ability on either side, with no clear advantage. Too much chance for mutual destruction.
Second: Technological advances may actually threaten war outside the realm of EBO. Complete and utter destruction of all entities in the enemy host may well be possible, if not quite now then in the future. Anything other than such destruction is likely to fit within a 3GW, 4GW, or 5GW framework. 1GW and 2GW really do seem to be things of the past, save for isolated and quite localized pockets in underdeveloped regions.
Third: There are other ways to change the concrete world besides warfare. Thomas Barnett's approach, for instance, may alter the concrete world in ways that may greatly influence targets' OODA loops, leading to acts beneficial to those who would employ TB's EBO. It is still to be seen, perhaps, if similar forces as TB would employ will have an unguided effect similar to those effects he would set as his operational goal. 5GW theory, in some respects, also suggests way of manipulating the concrete world through non-violent means, although violent means are also often discussed by 5GW theorists. In fact, TB's theories also skirt the bounds between violent and non-violent means.
NOTE: Links to the original blog posts have been altered to direct to the cross-posted entries here on Dreaming 5GW.
Effects Defined
Effects consist of a full spectrum of outcomes, events, or consequences that result from a particular action. An effects based approach to operations stresses the value of connecting all actions (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) to operational and strategic outcomes. In the most basic sense, effects-based operations are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes. The three essential features of effects-based operations (EBO)--planning, employment, and assessment--cannot be separated from one another.
[Sonny, at FX-Based, in "Deployment (From Hell)"]
Dr. Challans' critique of [EBO] reminds me of criticisms I have made against Objectivists -- and I am not surprised by this: Objectives/Objectivists. My central criticism is that Objectivists often fail to acknowledge 1) their limited sensory perceptions (experience), 2) their limited ability for analysis (which may be genetic; which may be a result of cognitive insularity), and 3) the objective reality of subjectivity (we do not have an objective theory of mind, but only hypotheses), while supposing that they have everything they need to make grand pronouncements on the shape and functions of the world and to prognosticate future events.[CGW, Phatic Communion, in "Emergence and Warfare: Notes and Hypotheses"]
But just as philosophers of science consistently demonstrate that the scientists themselves are not aware of the deep structures of their own practices, the same is true of philosophers of social science and social scientists. This difference in viewing the concept of causation as it relates to human action has perhaps always separated those who approach human activity philosophically from those who approach it scientifically. Within the effects-based approach, the military is attempting to cause effects outside the realm of the physical world; they are trying to bring effects about in the realm of human activity. Causation is not the proper concept when dealing with human activity. Many advocates of the effects-based approach have even attempted to make their so-called scientific approach to appear to be philosophical by looking toward the philosophical literature on causation. They mistakenly believe that something as complex as human activity can be rendered and reduced and mutilated to fit the Procrustean bed of behaviorism, choking the mental realm into lifelessness with their chains of cause and effect. This attempt by EBA [effects-based approach] advocates is both pseudo-scientific and pseudo-philosophical....This makes much sense, which is why critics of EBO have such solid footing. Who hasn't attempted to modify the behavior of a child, a spouse or significant other, or employee by introducing a change in the physical environment -- only to have an entirely unexpected and undesired effect when the subject of our experimentation decides upon a course of correction we did not anticipate?The deep assumption here is that people can be caused to behave, and modifying behavior is simply a matter of adjusting input to get a different output. Action theory recognizes that the mental realm falls outside the normal physical realm of cause and effect. One simply cannot cause another person to act a certain way; people act for reasons, not causes.
[Dr. Challans]
Sonny of FX-Based has recently responded to critics of EBO -- particularly, to an essay by Ralph Peters titled "Bloodless theories, bloody wars; Easy-win concepts crumble in combat" -- with a defense of EBO in three parts: Part One, Part Two, Part Three (with more to come.) Sonny writes one of the top-notch military blogs around, and his arguments against various assertions made by Ralph Peters are highly recommended reading. Essentially, Sonny argues that EBO is not a strategy involving high-tech attacks on the infrastructure of our enemy, per se, but a broad approach to warfare which recognizes the very real reality of cause & effect during wartime activities. Dr. Challans may be quite correct when he suggests a difference between causes and reasons for human activity, but by disregarding any relationship between concrete effects and the reasons humans choose for acting is to disregard humanity entirely: man may not live by bread alone, but without it or some substitute, he will die.
I.e., We live within the world and reason from it.
Consider again the child or the spouse. We have sufficient proof that the threat of physical force, particularly if it follows previous applications of physical force, can modify a child's or spouse's behavior. Children locked in cycles of physical abuse, just like spouses locked in those cycles, may submit; or, maintain the secrecy of the situation while acting according to the will of the abuser. Their reason for doing so is a memory of the consequences of not doing so, consequences which have a very concrete nature. However, we must ask if a new spouse or newly adopted child unfamiliar with such consequences will submit to a new threat or a new and unexpected act of violence; perhaps the child or spouse will run away or in fact attempt to kill the attacker. Thus, are the limits of EBO, very broadly stated, limits which will make more sense if we consider more fully the Revised OODA loop......
Boyd's decision-making process as a fighter pilot, because it occurred within very limited milieux, did not need to more fully take into account the distinction between the abstract world and the concrete world, since the abstract world only had tangential effects on the concrete activities of either fighter pilot. Either would be much more focused on a shared concrete domain (i.e., the sky, the fighter jets.) Changing an enemy's relation to his past experiences and cultural traditions would have been largely unimportant during a dogfight, even if these factors were exploited: The pilot would exploit long-standing factors, but would not need to more fully engage those factors. It was enough that they were there.
Unfortunately, for any confrontation beyond the immediate -- e.g., in longer campaigns -- such long-standing factors would affect so many other variables, in so many directions, that putting a consideration of them on autopilot would likely prove disastrous -- this, in a nutshell, is Dr. Challans' criticism, Ralph Peter's criticism, and the general criticism of EBO.
When we consider Effects-Based Operations, then, we need to consider more fully:
We have some control over #2, because humans in general -- including us, including our enemy -- view the concrete world similarly. If a bridge is blown up, both parties are going to see that in fact it has been blown up. But observation for humans is two-fold, since it includes not only concrete sensory perception but also how that concrete information is turned into an awareness within the brain. The old argument about the tree falling in the woods with nobody present would serve as a good example. Does it make a sound? Technically, no, since it creates vibrations in the air and ground and nearby objects, and it is only our mind that interprets the presence of these vibrations as sound. That is a facile example, and most humans have very similar interpretative abilities -- would be aware of sound if present at the tree's falling -- but the process of cognition is very quick and will include many more things during the individual's observation of phenomena, such as previous experience of phenomena. Thus our control over an enemy's observation, or #2 above, is only partial, because his past experience was long set before we blew up the bridge. Furthermore, the enemy's concrete observations of things other than the bridge, which also enter his decision-making cycle, may alter his awareness of what has occurred or limit his awareness of the blown-up bridge. (If he's deeply entrenched in a bunker, he may feel the vibrations through the ground without being aware that the bridge itself was destroyed.)
We have the least amount of control over #3. Although we may have some idea about our enemy's habitual thought patterns, experiences, etc., these tend to be things which are previously set for our enemy -- and, for us. I.e., we may easily create a concrete effect in the world, but we cannot so easily go back to our enemy's childhood and reconstruct his memories and past experiences, his cultural traditions, up to the point of that concrete effect, in order to give that concrete effect an interpretation (by the enemy) of our choosing. The enemy may have past awareness -- past experience -- of tunnels he uses for supply routes and may interpret the destruction of the bridge as an only incidental occurrence. In particular, our own history of observing that enemy -- intelligence information -- may seemingly give us more or less control over #3, although even the smallest gaps in our intel could produce resulting gaps in our ability to control our enemy's interpretation of events. Plus, quite idiosyncratic and personal behavior may be quite unknown to us, at least the extent to which such behavioral traits might influence enemies; e.g., Saddam Hussein's megalomania (or, Hitler's, at the time of WWII.)
These factors correspond to the Concrete OODA of the Revised OODA:
[Concrete OODA]Note that although I have not drawn a direct line from Act to World, the line is implied, since our physical acts alter the concrete world. Also note the most obvious and most important implication: that our ability to affect an enemy always stems from manipulation of the physical world. Until psychic powers are realized, this will remain the case. (And even then, I would bet that stimulation of brain waves by some mechanical means, from outside an enemy's body, would best be considered a physical act. If such a thing ever comes to pass.) Finally, note the degree to which such a consideration ultimately confounds many theories of 4GW and 5GW or at least limits them -- and the way such a consideration severely limits what may be accomplished via EBO.
On that last point: Too often when reading theory of 4GW, 5GW, and EBO, I detect a belief -- or, call it a faith -- that we may directly affect an enemy's abstract processes. For instance, when we talk of moral and morale manipulation as methods used by a 4GW fighter, some mystical direct link is implied: "4GW insurgents sap our will to fight." That is putting it too simply, however, and risks devastating illusion by putting too much faith in that illusion of a direct link, or of a direct operation on our own abstract processes by the enemy. This is not to say that our morale cannot be sapped, but it is giving the enemy too much credit for that effect. Sonny of FX-Based, in his defense of EBO, gives a very good example of the process in his response to Ralph Peters:
...strategic bombing preceding D-DAY did play a crucial role in Nazi Germany's defeat. The main problem was that one of our main pre-war suppositions proved to be incorrect: the German industrial infrastructure proved to be more resistant to attack than what we originally expected. However, the USSBS showed that aerial attacks had actually worn out the morale of the German people and had increased absenteeism to some extent in the later phases of the war. The attacks conducted by the AAF and the Royal Air Force (RAF) from July to December 1943 did not obliterate all of the German industrial machinery, but they did compel the Germans to disperse manufacturing functions at a critical point in the war. [ed. -- emphasis added]We might argue whether such an EBO effect -- lowering morale -- would be inevitable in every situation, including possible future scenarios; and, we would be right to do so. For instance, I suspect that the German response was also a result of comparing past status to the status created by aerial attacks and seeing a major difference -- but some future enemy might never have had a highly efficient and safe environment prior to such bombing, and the morale-sapping effect might be less. I.e., this future foe might not have had a previously bloated image of self due to a productive environment, thus would not be as greatly affected by having that environment systematically destroyed -- This is the "ascetic bin Laden hiding in mountains" effect. Other factors might limit the drop in morale; consider, for instance, Britain and Churchill under repeated bombings.[Sonny, at FX-Based, in "In Defense of EBO"]
The arguments against EBO are really arguments against limited deployment of EBO. I.e., they are arguments against robotic, ill-conceived, limited and repetitive operations regardless of environment and enemy, and such arguments are spot-on. Although to some degree we can anticipate very similar reactions for most people in response to large-scale devastation -- we are all human -- the limitations on devastation imposed by modern warfare strategies and the general so-called "laws of war" severely limit our ability to affect large numbers of people successfully. So much that is common between people that would give us a better understanding of reactions to operations also becomes a barrier to what we may do to a people. The Golden Rule has limited EBO warfare. When Ralph Peters uses the phrase "sterilized techno-wars," he is on the right track -- especially also since those we most need to affect, the enemy's military, may be quite separate from the people, or hidden among the people, and even less susceptible to the manipulation of a concrete environment than the person on the street: The abstract processing of those in the military forces may be quite unlike the abstract processing of the typical citizen of a society. High-tech bombings may terrify and disrupt the person on the street, but guerrilla fighters might go underground and wait it out -- worse, such a bombing campaign may not affect everyone in the general populace the same way and could lead to larger numbers of guerrilla recruits.
At the same time, the link between cause and effect in the concrete world is omnipresent and difficult to refute; as Sonny at FX-Based has said,
An effects-based approach is a common-sense and intuitive way to conduct operations.How, pray tell, can we conduct a war without creating changed concrete environments through physicial acts -- whether it is "EBO," or 4GW or 5GW?
[Sonny, at FX-Based, in "In Defense of EBO - Part Two"]
Everything in war is effects-based -- almost.
Almost. Because the only sure way to know how our enemy will react to our actions is to kill him. EBO as a theory is a theory of how to cause a living enemy to do what we want, whether it is to make a horrible move or to surrender, and the desire to understand EBO well enough to employ it comes from an understanding that we cannot completely and utterly destroy our enemy physically, at least not at the moment. If we could destroy him utterly through a physical act of our own, we would not need to have an EBO theory.
Although we may act only physically upon the world -- despite the superstitious theory that we are all somehow "connected" via a "network" and able to act upon each other metaphysically or outside the realm of physics -- we have some limited ability to Go Deep into the enemy's abstract processes or gain an objective understanding, even if limited, of those processes. In order to do so, we must remember how those abstract processes occur and not leave such things as "cultural traditions" and "past experiences" cloudy and completely removed from a consideration of the physical world.
[Abstract OODA]
All mental constructs -- previous experience, memories, ideologies, understanding -- are a result of information flowing from the exterior world over a lifetime, which has been analyzed, synthesized, perhaps re-examined multiple times (Decide-Hypothesize), and no doubt often corrupted, before becoming "imprinted" within the mind. (Remember, genetic heritage, including all physical processes -- meaning even those shaping analytical ability -- are a part of the concrete world constantly feeding into the Abstract Observation of a person. We are dynamically alive, and such factors can change throughout a lifetime.) When we act upon the physical world, changing it, that new information enters the enemy's Abstract OODA in the Abstract Observation along with old information previously imprinted. Dr. Challans' argument that human activity should be considered from an understanding of reason rather than of cause-effect is only partly true, since many concrete causes have shaped our mental constructs; but reason is limited because our life experiences are limited by such factors as: our physical being (including sex, including the functioning of our senses, including our mental capacities); our family and early environment; and the dominant culture(s) of our society. Thus, we might often act from reason more informed by old information than by new information; or, vice versa.
So there are two processes occurring, which might or might not align: our action upon the world and our enemy's reaction to the changed world. EBO is what we do, but "EBR" or effects-based reaction is what the living enemy does -- in fact, is what we ourselves may do in reaction to that world we have changed, when we observe it. EBO is not everything in war, just as the Concrete OODA is not all that occurs for humans: Cause and reason. But since reasoning will almost certainly include old information, the strict physical cause-effect basis of some EBO theory is insufficient for understanding the successful employment of EBO, since our enemy will not be reacting strictly to the changed environment or to that physical cause but also on the basis of prior learning, cultural traditions, and experience, etc. So more properly speaking "EBR" should be renamed "EIR", or effects-influenced reasoning.
To contemplate an EBO approach without first considering the mental constructs of our enemies -- largely by ignoring how our enemies' environments have shaped their mental constructs -- should not be considered an effects-based operation whatsoever. It is really an ideologically-driven operation, since we are operating more from our own pre-built abstractions of our enemy, and how our enemy will react, than from an actual understanding of that enemy. This is the argument Ralph Peters makes when he criticizes certain high-tech and "sterile" approaches to warfare advocated ad infinitum by certain Pentagon officials. Essentially, whether he knew it or not, Peters was criticizing our tendency to approach our enemies as if they were all carbon-copies of each other likely to always react in the way previous foes have reacted to such effects-based operations. I.e., those carbon-copies are just our abstractions of the enemy -- more likely, our abstractions of the enemy's Abstract OODA -- rather than actual enemies. Incidentally, however, Peters may have some carbon-copy alternatives himself, since he appears to assume that the approach is always doomed to failure or often doomed to failure, at least against the foes we are likely to confront in the short term. (He may be correct in this; but that's a subject for a different post. I doubt that he should make a universal evaluation of such a limited EBO campaign, however.)
Sonny at FX-Based, as quoted in the lead-in to this post, has expanded the concept of EBO beyond Peters' consideration, and would not limit EBO to only one style of fighting:
An effects based approach to operations stresses the value of connecting all actions (political, diplomatic, economic, and military) to operational and strategic outcomes.This is good as far as it goes, but it should not go without a consideration of the Abstract OODA. I.e., as we decide which actions upon the world are required for influencing an enemy that we aren't simply wanting to utterly destroy and able to utterly destroy, we must remember that an enemy's past will filter every observation of the world that we have altered by our acts. We must know his cultural environment, his past environments, etc., as well as we can before drawing any conclusions about how he will react to our actions. And, while we might read in a textbook or hear a lecture about cultural influences, past experiences of our enemy, and the like, these remain mere abstractions for us until we have been able to witness them in action in the concrete world; thus, some amount of experimentation, or preliminary acts, might be required in order for us to draw a conclusion that an enemy will react the way we think he might react. Like the enemy, our abstract processes are our own, but we may see in the physical world concrete manifestations of those abstract processes -- or, Acts.
[Sonny, ibid.]
There is at least one universal "truth" we might draw from the Abstract OODA, however, vis-a-vis EBO. Impulsive Acts are those committed with more of an eye on unfolding circumstances than on past experience and other mental constructs (even if these also influence such action.) I gave this example of an Impulsive Act in Part One of this series:
...consider a different Impulsive Act: While at the Mall, a person suddenly hears lots of gunfire near him, sees people falling, and rather than quickly duck behind a convenient metal barrier starts running around, screaming -- and, gets shot. But a person who has been in combat situations might quickly duck behind the barrier: a reflexive act based more on past experience than on present new information and sudden ideas of impending death.Present new information and sudden ideas of impending death. -- One we might create by our action, if only we can know that the new information is really new for a target; the other is a common fear for most people but not all. As a metaphor, however, this would suggest how rapid changes within a concrete environment, of a certain type, might cause an enemy to react impulsively. True, we might have no firm understanding of exactly how he will react, but the fact that his action will be impulsive might be enough, particularly if we could create a quick recycling through O-O-D(Hyp.) and back to O of the Abstract OODA of our enemy. He would be forced either into paralysis or into committing an impulsive act.[CGW, Dreaming 5GW, "Rethinking the OODA"]
NOTE: Links to the original blog posts have been altered to direct to the cross-posted entries here on Dreaming 5GW.
"First, does the word orientation in the phrase ['homosexual orientation'] match up with the orient of OODA?
"Most gays who use the phrase actually use it to describe the physical being (or preconditions) rather than as we might use the word in OODA: 'We're born that way! It's genetic!' etc. In this case, orientation does not match up with orient...." [CGW]
"Unless a strict genetic determinist model is being argued here, the words 'orientaiton' are being used the same way. Genetic factors are part of Orientation, as they are in life. But so is conditioning, cultural factors, synthesis and analysis, etc." [Dan, tdaxp]
"No, I do not believe so. I think you are dead wrong on this, and I think that diagrams like this diagram are either wrong or perhaps misleading...." [CGW]
But this becomes a mess -- we don't really understand how the different parts of Orientation work together, and all the excess information confuses the eye. Plus, each of the new boxes are truly unknown themselves -- genetic heritage is an area of new research, not known facts, etc. We know each of the new boxes are sub-processes -- genetics don't "stop," nor does reconstruction of old experiences, but how do they work? Unknown.Such a consideration may lead us to think of Orient as a "Magic Cloud." The process may be cloudy, but we know that something happens within the mind during the thought process, in which all these pieces interact to orient us; and thus, this cloudy understanding is magical: we don't understand it, but it understands or continues to operate.
[Dan, tdaxp]
Middle English, from Latin abstractus, past participle of abstrahere, to draw away : abs-, ab-, away; + trahere, to draw.-- i.e., we may think of this as "drawing in the mind" of the concrete world, even if that is the wrong draw; or we might say that after observing the World, we then "draw away" from that world and begin to consider it abstractly. We analyze these abstracts, synthesize them, think about them, and make decisions about them, whether consciously or subconsciously. Not everything after World is abstract, however; Act is a physical action, and Unfolding Interaction w/ Environment [UIE] is how we make changes in the concrete world based on our considerations of abstracts of that world. Thus, I consider the feedback line from Act to Observe as being somewhat a blurring of the concrete and abstract, since in all actuality, our action upon/within the world changes that world. The line should have been drawn back to World, and then we would follow the line from World to Observe for an observation of our unfolding action upon/within the World. [This, incidentally, will figure significantly in my consideration of EBO, or Effects-Based Operations, in the second part of this series.]
As poorly as we sometimes are at paying attention extrospectively - we could benefit far more by greater attention or some old fashioned Zen "mindfulness" being directed inward. Metacognitive regulation requires an introspective monitoring of one's thoughts and ideas, which means active, conscious, effort to pay attention.I suspect that such Zen mindfulness, though on the surface seeming quite introspective, is in fact a method of disentangling oneself from inordinate focus on abstract thoughts. I.e., we are often "viewing" our own thoughts when we think we are engaging in "extrospection" -- really, we are not distinguishing between the two -- and by making ourselves more aware of our internal cognitive processes, we may become better able to separate what is real and what is only a memory or pale imitation of past extrospection (if even that.) Interestingly, Mark mentions master Yogis and Zen monks who were able "to effect significant physiological changes" merely by focusing inwardly. This may seem like a refutation of the Revised OODA loop, in that mind acts directly on the physical world rather than the other way around, but it's not. In fact, such a decision and act are methods of acting physically upon the world, or upon one's own physiological being; our minds have brains and a body of electro-chemical processes which may act upon the world just like hands and feet may act upon the world. So these Yogis and master Zen monks have an ability to Observe the physical world -- their genetic heritage, or bodies -- and act upon it.
[Mark Safranski, ZenPundit]
NOTE: Links to the original blog posts have been altered to direct to the cross-posted entries here on Dreaming 5GW.
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