ZenPundit has underscored a crucial factor in the evolution of the "xGW" model: how does one discriminate between 4GW (culture-based asymmetrical warfare focused on the "rage of the people") and 5GW (perception-based warfare focused on the context of conflict)?
Recent posts here at D5GW (in particular ARHerring's "Left of Boom/Right of Boom" analysis of kinetics in xGW, and Curtis's "X vs. X" follow-up) describe interrelationship of the various "generations" -- key to any theoretical framework.
I'd like to add another element to the foundation: the Clausewitzian "Trinity" (developed in Book II of Karl von Clausewitz's magnum opus, On War). Clausewitz, in developing his famous assertion that "war is a continuation of politics by other means," describes three core elements of any campaign:
- Rationality (of the state)
- Probability (in military command)
- Rage (of the population)
Much of the "Cold War" ethos of warfighting was vested in the first premise: the rationality of the state (q.v., "Mutually Assured Destruction" doctrine in nuclear warfare). Similarly, insurgencies like the U.S. faced in Vietnam forty years ago -- and in Iraq today -- are driven by the third premise: the rage of the people.
Could 5th Generation Warfare (where perception and context are key) be described as a fusion of popular rage with political rationality, where the very idea of "conflict" is altered in order to create conditions favorable to the 5th Generation warrior? Such a feat would logically factor the second premise (the probabilistic calculus of the military commander) out of the equation -- or at least reduce its relevance in the larger battle of ideas.
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