Results tagged “Kinetics”

Doing the Unthinkable

I think the problem comes from the simple power of the word “war”. It immediately brings up images of uniformed soldiers with weapons hurting other soldiers (at best) or, more likely, innocent civilians. That concept of warfare is pretty solid in the minds of most Westerners and will need a long time to acquire a redefinition.

-- Seán at Skilluminati Research

I agree 100% that 5GW is an event horizon for warfare theory—it’s where war merges with everything else, where things become so radically different that the old theory is more of a hinderance than a help.

-- Thirtyseven at Skilluminati Research.


The conundrum is nothing new. October 12, 2006, I wrote a post to answer another blog's commenter's question, "Where is the 'war' part?" using a little hyperbole to vent a little frustration:


This manipulation of observation would appear to be non-war by traditional definitions. The glory of dismembering bodies and destroying infrastructure in the pursuit of ‘showing the enemy what’s what!’ would seem to be sidelined. In fact, the question seems almost to come from a 1GW perspective, and I have occasionally witnessed the greatest disdain for 5GW theory coming from soldiers and their officers in the field. They have after all been trained to dismember enemies and destroy battle placements, or to wipe out an enemy’s operational capability through a quite limited EBO which seems less limited simply because the devastation can be directed over large areas through targeted aerial bombings and missile strikes.


The conundrum will be new for everyone who must contend with unfolding circumstances in the future. As I concluded after the above statements, in reference to the traditional conceptualization of war I gave there, "We are witnessing the effectiveness of these strategies in Iraq and on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, are we not?"

To put it another way without drawing the whole picture for you dear reader, what sorts of bombs and EBO will work against the destructive super-empowered individual?

How does traditional warfare play on the little screen, as opposed to the big screen; and what hinders it's efficacy? What else must be attacked which cannot be hit by soldiers in uniform or precision-guided missiles?

To put it another way, this one more "geeky" (a label I recently received from elsewhere) I will refer to a post I wrote in February 2007, "A Kinder, Gentler War?", and these lines:

The belief that utter destruction of our foes is possible, or else that sufficient kinetic force will either force them to our way of thinking or fence them in, is founded upon the notion that what goes into the OODA loop of our foe comes out without interference from his reasoning. I.e., it is the grossest form of Objectivism possible, entirely entrenched in the assumption that what is done to the physical world will have a direct, predictable result in shaping the enemy’s activity (whether he dies or submits), as if all enemies are merely carbon copy constructs of our own imagining. It is a linear epistemology; and those with the most faith in kinetic force tend to be those who overlook complexity and confluential processes, preferring to eliminate complexity by obliterating whatever does not hold to their line of sight.


--but such people continue to exist, and will continue, which is why so much that is "unthinkable" will continue to shape the world around them in unexpected ways. Indeed, 5GWarriors -- yes, I'm using warriors -- will be especially grateful to those opponents who look linearly, or, that is, only straight down their noses at what lies directly in front of them. Then, the observation will continue to be something like this:




I.e., all those straight lines become static, as nothing makes sense; attacking each linear threat will cause them to dissipate themselves physically, operationally, materially, or despair of ever achieving victory.

The "invisibility" or the "Secret" in 5GW depends upon the inability, in their opponents, of making sense of the static.  This does not mean that actual activities, occurrences, and so forth are entirely unwitnessed or invisible/Secret -- but I've gone over that before as well (here and here)...

In fact, I began to wonder if an entirely secret SecretWar is possible, and I wondered if maybe the concept of an absolutely secret SecretWar has led some of our recent brainstorming on 5GW down the wrong path. If, indeed, absolute secrecy is impossible, then a SecretWarrior might need to shape the processes by which her opponent reacts to the effects of 5GW.

Indeed, the 5GWarriors will want their foes to react to dangers, dangers that will need to be utterly apparent.  What won't be apparent, however, is the fact that a 5GWarrior is behind the events; that's his secrecy.

X vs X: Follow-up and Query

Reviewing my last post, "X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict", (which Dan tdaxp linked with kind words; thanks!), I wonder if the diagram ought to be updated.

I had used this diagram to show the generational conflict and general progression of generations, relating them to each other and to Boom:
Boom and xGW Dispersal of Kinetics.jpgNow I wonder if I should have tweaked the diagram one step further to better show the dispersal of kinetics/centers of gravity with the generational progression; like this:


Boom and xGW with Graphical Dispersal of Kinetics.jpgThis re-visioning has the added benefit of showing, to the left of Boom, the general progression leftward of each generation, so that the left/right relationship between the generations also appears vertically.  Where 3GW is "left of Boom" when in conflict with 2GW, it is also further left on the Left in relationship to 2GW.

This revised diagram also gives a visual representation to "dispersal."

In Dan's post, he offered a summarization of part of my previous post:

The tug of gravity weakens exponentially with the addition of each new dimension through which it may propagate.*

I wonder if we might use this revision of the diagram to add new dimensions to our understanding of the xGW model.  Specifically, I wonder if we might use the horizontal distance between competing generational strategies, as displayed in the diagram -- the increased dispersal of kinetics -- to come to a better understanding of the necessary time frames required for each new generational approach to win over the previous generational approach.

I.e., with the dispersal of kinetics and the multiplication of points of attack, perhaps "the tug of gravity" indeed weakens, necessitating longer time frames for victory.  No single kinetic attack can create victory, but many, many are required for the cumulative effect.  Then, we might see how a 4GW approach requires much longer to reach victory over 3GW forces than a 3GW force requires for defeating a 2GW force, for example.  5GW strategies, then, might indeed require a "Long War" when used to combat 4GW forces.





* edited to correct typos!

Arherring's intriguing reconceptualization of the xGW framework, "XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom", has inspired me to take my own route tying the concept of "Boom" to the generational model.

The term Boom, as I see it, describes the kinetics which occur during conflict.  We might borrow Arherring's phrasing and consider only the operative kinetics for each generation -- i.e., the type of kinetic activity which defines each generation, generation by generation, and through which each generation succeeds (or attempts to succeed), although many other kinetic activities may also occur -- because it is a valuable way of contemplating the generations and kinetic activity; but what if we simply lump all kinetic activity together and call it "Boom"?

Hidden within Arherring's diagram of the generations in relationship to Boom,Arherring Boom and xGW.jpgis another which may describe each generation in relationship to the generation which precedes it and to the generation which follows it.  Arherring's approach may seem to leave the question of these relationships to the side; he has considered each generation in relationship to the Boom, and only from that consideration do we find some type of relationship between them.  I have attempted to include these intergenerational relationships in a revisioning of the diagram, or a redrawing, to add new dimensions.

XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom

A New Point of View on the Relationship Between Kinetic Action and XGW.

 

The Generations of Warfare model is most often viewed as a progression. The term 'generation' itself reinforces this, implying the process of one leading to another. As a result, many of the concepts we have studied in our explorations of 5GW in particular, and XGW in general, have their roots in this step-like or ladder-like point of view. A prime example is the consideration that each successive generation is specifically designed to circumvent the relative strength of the immediately previous generation. Another example of progression is the observation that the higher the generation of warfare used by an organization, the more generally dispersed the kinetic activity will be. This point of view contains a great deal of merit and shows consistent results and patterns that help theorists grasp the underlying truths the model contains. However, there are other ways to view XGW that can offer valuable insight.

 

A New Point of View:

 

Imagine a continuum in the form of a timeline. In the center of the timeline is a fixed point that represents kinetic action, or the 'Boom'. To the left of the Boom are events that influence the kinetic action. To the right of the Boom are events that are influenced by the kinetic action. When the operative actions, or the actions that embody the distinctions between each generation of XGW, are placed on the timeline relative to the Boom a very interesting and somewhat striking pattern seems to emerge.

In case you missed it, read it here.

The Generations of War in the Context of Realms and Kinetics

(tdaxp's note: This is a cross-post of 'Orientation and Action, Part II: The OODA-PISRR Loop.' That article is one of two sequels for 'Go Deep,' my very first post on 5GW. 'Go Deep' is now split up into Orientation and Action, Introduction: On War Since John Boyd and Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop. The other sequel to 'Go Deep,' 'Dreaming 5th Generation War,' is the post for which this group blog is named.)

The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop of John Boyd is not only a model of human cognition.


It is also useful in aligning the generations of modern war within the framework of human cognition

Likewise, the broader Observe-Orient-Decide-Act/Penetrate-Isolate-Subvert-Reorient-Reharmonize Social loop is not only a model of social cognition

ooda_pisrr_09
It is also useful in aligning the kinetic intensity within the framework of social cognition
waveform_one

Both of these findings can be synthesized by viewing the generations of modern war within the framework of social cognition.

Consider that the second generation of modern war (2GW), based on concentrate of firepower, is the strong-suit of the state in war. Likewise, consider that the fourth generation of modern war (4GW), based on idelogical coherency, is the strong-suit of the insurgent in war.

From this we can place the third generatin of modern war (3GW), based on mobility, in between the state's and the insurgent's spheres of influence.

And this makes sense. In Patterns of Conflict, John Boyd describes maneuver warfare as "blitz/guerilla."

(One might just as easily as say "Global Guerrilla / Panzer General")

There are two remaining generations of modern war, and both fall outside the realms of the state and non-state. The first generation (1GW), built on total mobilization, was designed for states able to conscript a large fraction of the male population but unable to communicate effectively enough to effective combine firepower. Thus we place 1GW to the left of 2GW, as belonging to an actor which we would describe as a state... almost. (Compare the workings of Napoleonic France to that of a modern state to see how a 1G "state" falls short.)

Likewise, place the fifth generation of modern warfare (5GW) to the right of 4GW. 5GW is the domain of non-states... almost. When a 5GW is used by a state, it's actually the province of a "state within" that acts as an internal insurgency. The Military-Industrial-Complex devised by President Truman is the work of such a 5GW conspiracy-within-the-state.

Blue Circle encompasses the Realm of the State Red Circle encompasses the Realm of the Non-State

The take-away from this visualization is as follows:

  • each 'higher' generation of war is less kinetically intense than the one before it.
  • Further, states tend to be victorious in areas where intensity is high but not overwhelming -- between 2GW and 3GW.
  • At the same time, non-states tend to be victorious at low but not underwhelming kinetic intensity -- between 3GW and 5GW.
  • Finally, 1GW and 5GW fall outside the realms of both the state and the non-state, and into the lands of the proto-state and the state-within.

Thanks to Ryan Luke of Social Engage, and of course my co-authors on this blog, for the questions and criticisms that made this post possible.

Kinetics and Violence

The genesis of this post is the comments section for ZenPundit's autoborking post on JL Kirk Associates. However, I think it has some broad applications. In particular, I am wondering if "kinetic" is the right words in the following progression

  • Extermination is more kinetic than violence
  • Violence is more kinetic than threats of violence
  • Threats of violence are kinetic kinetic than social sanctions
  • Social sanctions are more kinetic than threats of social sanctions
  • Threats of social sanctions are more kinetic than manipulation
  • Manipulation is more kinetic than stasis

For context, I would want to use the same word ("kinetic" or whatever) in the following progression as well

  • 0GW is more kinetic than 1GW
  • 1GW is more kinetic than 2GW
  • 2GW is more kinetic than 3GW
  • 3GW is more kinetic than 4GW
  • 4GW is more kinetic than 5GW
  • 0GW is more kinetic than Peace

Your thoughts?

Warfare Continua

In his last post, "5GW: The Vertical and The Horizontal," Arherring connected a consideration of vertical and horizontal activity with Dan tdaxp's generational continuum as well as with the notions of kinetic and non-kinetic activity.  This represents an important framework, although I had more questions after reading Arherring's post than I had before.  I commented,

Your post caught me a little off-guard, in statements like

It stands to reason that a 5GW attack with a lower “G” generally requires a smaller more simple organization, even shrinking down to the size of an individual with a goal.

Dan has postulated a generational trend toward a higher "G", 5GW is at the future end of it, but here you have postulated 5GW effectors working at the past end of it, or primarily kinetically. This goes against all my previous thinking -- any time kinetic force is used, forensics can trace the origin and thus 'out' the fighter -- and so, although I think that much in the post is intriguing, something seems fundamentally 'off' for me.

After the above statement, you have considered the likelihood that these warriors are more likely to be detected, etc. I think that very likelihood is what will make any such activity quite dangerous for a nominal '5GW force' -- in fact, it would be one sign that the force is not next-generational. This is quite separate from the possibility that a 5GW force would utilize proxies whenever it wanted to 'operate' kinetically; if those forces are discovered to exist, as they would be, that would be part of the 5GW plan.

Interestingly, then, this kinetic-operation-through-proxy is 'horizontal kinetic activity' from the perspective of the 5GW organization -- i.e., in describing what they are doing -- although not from the perspective of those proxies or their targets.

I'm not sure that last statement is helpful; it could be too much blurring of these concepts, although I think that such a blurring might only be a way of naming one type of interaction between different continua (continuums).

There are really four dynamics at play, right?

  1. The G continuum.  This is Dan tdaxp's formulation: "It seems to be that 'G' measures the kinetic intensity of conflict, which every new G being approximately 20 times less intense than the one below it."
  2. The Horizontal - Vertical continuum: HV.  One might rightly ask whether this is a continuum or an absolute dichotomy; the difference will likely lie in where we draw the 'cut-off' between the state or organization and the individual.  Some trends in contemporary theory would postulate many different dynamics which affect this distinction: globalization; superempowerment of individuals; the decreasing significance of the state; even democratic and capitalistic forces.  (E.g., the Islamist attacks on American civilians -- which are quite vertical -- are said by Islamists to be symmetrical because America is a democracy:  the vertical actions of the state are also vertical actions of the citizens, using the State and its employees as a proxy.  In that formulation, even the horizontal activity of America's citizens, which happens to greatly affect the composition of the State, have an ultimate vertical effect.)
  3. The Non-Kinetic - Kinetic action continuum: K.  I am more likely to say that every action is kinetic.  Even speech and writing operate kinetically, by producing sounds and letters (or pixels).  However, this variable represents a value on a continuum; we can also postulate a distinction between actions that have a corresponding and immediate concrete reaction and those that do not.  E.g., if you drop bombs on a bridge, that bridge will immediately react by blowing up, but if you publish an essay, the written letters you are creating may not produce an immediate reaction.

  4. The Closed Source - Open Source continuum: S.  Again, the distinction between these may appear indistinct or in fact they may appear to be a dichotomy rather than a continuum.  Using the example of the last election cycle in America, we might say that the State is a result of an open-source effort -- so many individuals feed into the process -- but also that the elections are a closed-sourced effort -- only legal citizens of voting age, with legitimate forms of i.d. and a legitimate status could vote.  A group of terrorists might operate similarly, particularly if they are using coded methods of communication which only certain organizations, not only their own particular organization, can understand; e.g., not only a shared language but also specific web sites, code words, etc.  On the low end of the continuum, only a handful of people may have a common understanding and use it to operate in the world; but still, it's conceivable that they would pool their information is a very limited 'open source' manner.
These dynamics interrelate, but I think we have only barely scratched the surface in trying to determine how they interrelate.

For instance, Dan's G Continuum would seem to match up directly with the reverse of the K Continuum, but although in general this is accurate, I think we should view them as separate although relating continua.  E.g., on the whole a low-G war effort may seem to be high on the K Continuum -- i.e., be much more kinetic -- but we would be better served by considering individual activities on the K Continuum and then match up the percentages of those activities, in comparison to the percentage of non-kinetic activities, in any war effort and thus establish what Dan has called kinetic intensity. So a 5GW will have a low K intensity (Ki), but this does not mean that an individual operation cannot be high in the K Continuum; it's just that the 5GW war effort on the whole will have far more non-kinetic activity.

The HV Continuum should be viewed separately as well, since it is quite possible to imagine highly kinetic horizontal activity and low-kinetic vertical activity.  For instance, the State can pass a new tax law which will not have an immediate concrete reaction (low K)  but still be quite vertical (high HV). Similarly, with respect to a larger system, individual crimes can be high K but low HV, i.e. highly kinetic but also horizontal.

I suppose we should also consider the relationship between the Closed Source - Open Source Continuum, S, and the HV Continuum, since in general a more open-source environment, high S,  will seem to also produce a low HV environment, or one that operates quite horizontally.  This becomes particularly interesting when we consider the fact that a 5GW organization will be low S, or closed source,  operating within a world in which so much else operates in high S.  I have previously expressed this notion with the metaphor:  5GWarriors will 'travel the open-source highway' while guided by their closed-source vision, all the while nudging the aggregate of the 'open-source highway' toward that same vision.  Vis-a-Vis 5GW, I reconcile the 5GW organization's place on the S Continuum with the global HV Continuum by postulating something similar to the American political system, except on a global scale:  although much may happen horizontally, these actions have an aggregate effect on the total system, which is closed source (no human society exists outside the global system), and this total system in turn exerts vertical force on those living within it.

As for the G Continuum, I think each of these factors can be considered in relation to the various generations of warfare.  For instance, in a system greatly directed, on the whole, by vertical forces (say, an absolute monarchy), high-intensity kinetic warfare is more likely to result, particularly also because the individual insular systems also had severe limitations on observational capabilities and communication (were more closed-source) and this limited the effectiveness on non-kinetic activity.  I.e., we may take it for granted that high K activities, because they produce immediate concrete effects that are observable on the local scale, also reinforce the closed-source approach because the source of both action and reaction are more easily ascertained; and the Supreme Leader, being one individual or a small coterie of planners living within an insular or shielded society, could not easily formulate plans when too much information is introduced into their planning (information which they usually did not have, btw.)

I'm sure more can be added to these considerations.  Considering the interplay between these continua will, I hope, help us better understand the coming of 5GW.

5GW: The Vertical and The Horizontal

"There is nothing wrong with your television set. Do not attempt to adjust the picture. We are controlling transmission. If we wish to make it louder, we will bring up the volume. If we wish to make it softer, we will tune it to a whisper. We can reduce the focus to a soft blur, or sharpen it to crystal clarity. We will control the horizontal. We will control the vertical. For the next hour, sit quietly and we will control all that you see and hear. You are about to experience the awe and mystery which reaches from the inner mind to... The Outer Limits."

The Outer Limits— Opening narration – The Control Voice – 1960s

Managing Multiple Strands

A lot of 5GW theory has focused on general broad aspects of the next generation of warfare, sometimes dipping into the esoteric and  philosophical basis of 5GW, and that's the way it should be.  Once on a post discussing EBO (crossposted here on Dreaming 5GW, although without comments), Sonny of FX Based expressed a complaint often expressed by those who do the really hard work operating in the field:

The theorist can theorize for years. The operator has to act under incredible pressure and on short notice.
This battle between theory and practice is really no battle, however ......

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