Results tagged “Complexity”

EBOv2

Previously in writing about EBOv2 (or, "Evolved EBO" as I quickly labeled it then), I noted that effects-based operations should be expanded to include two areas of observation when determining operations:

In general “effects-based” has two components:

1. “It is thus about producing desired futures.”  I.e., operations should be focused on pre-determined ultimate effects.  Our activities are therefore determined by those effects, or based upon those effects we are seeking.
2. “[T]hose engaging in effects-based operations must continuously adapt plans, rules, and assumptions to existing reality.” In other words, whatever effects actually occur within the world — as opposed to the pre-determined effects we have chosen — will shape our activities; our future activities will be based upon those effects.

One might summarize to say that, for successful adaptive operations, we must not only have a willingness to observe all that is occurring within our sphere of activity, but we must also have a clear primary goal.  In fact, we might go so far as to include a consideration of the OODA loop and say that the process of adaptation in EBOv2 is a conscious re-Orientation -- as opposed to an unconscious or subconscious re-Orientation.  Unconscious or subconscious re-Orientation occurs when either a) sight of the primary goal has been lost, b) the primary goal is, for whatever reasons, in the process of being altered (or is fluid), and/or c) the primary goal itself is unconscious or subconscious and not understood or apparent to the actor.  Of these, "c" may lead to a positive outcome with respect to the goal for any given action; but for ongoing and extended operations, "c" is more likely to devolve to either "a" or "b" over time than remain a useful guide.

The great stumbling-block for those who would conduct EBOv2 (and for that matter, those who have attempted plain old EBO) results from three different but interrelated conditions:

1. The setting of sights too low, with limited reach, when deciding a primary goal.
2. The inability to define, and thus observe and successfully act upon, an accurate sphere of activity.
3. The existence of others acting within the world who are themselves observing the world at large and setting their own sights on desired futures.

These conditions occur together.  A limited concept of the accurate sphere of activity reduces one's sights to accomplishing merely immediate objectives, never mind the fact that others operating in that limited sphere may be looking outside that sphere of activity for materiel and/or political/ideological support.

Furthermore, those others affecting the battlefield may not actually be within that limited sphere, at least not in a way that will be greatly affected by the limited application of EBO.  Exterior allies of the interior target may affect anything from the supplying of that target (in the case of materiel) to the global marketplace (economic or ideological) upon which the practitioner of EBO depends.  The application of a limited EBO, in an attempt to accomplish a limited goal, may begin to resemble, for lack of a better description, "pissing into the wind."

Finally, the practitioner of limited EBO, through a lack of foresight, may ignore others outside that sphere who could help accomplish even those limited objectives in a lasting manner by helping to achieve more significant objectives not within the limited EBO.  Thomas Barnett points at an example of this when he laments that "The Leviathan is screwed."  In that case, the Leviathan -- the military arm -- attempted to also be the SysAdmin -- or, nation-builder, ignoring the level of support from without, some of it coming within also, that would be required.  (This, incidentally, may be an example of "b" above, or of a shifting, fluid primary objective, since the great effort at SysAdmin was not a part of the major planning for the initial operations.)  Another example, or at least allegory:  short-term gains led our marketplace into the thickets of recession, with the only apparent solution as viewed by those in command being the expansion of the sphere of activity of governments around the world, whether through stimulus packages or bail-outs or broader regulation, often acting in unison.  (Regardless of efficacy or wisdom for any of these responses, these show the sudden realization that an expansion of the sphere of activity would be required.)

To sum:  Without a primary objective that is broad enough, and which takes into account all the domains or battlespaces and actors who may affect that objective, EBO becomes too limited to be of much use and in fact may become counterproductive.

The stumbling-block, in short, is an issue of scope -- with the attending issue of complexity.  In my next post, I'll look at the idea of  Open Space Technology as a guide for how we may approach and overcome that stumbling-block.  

We have no future because our present is too volatile. We only have risk management. The spinning of the given moment’s scenarios. Pattern recognition.

-William Gibson, Pattern Recognition

Wiggins (another name soon due for a "redux"; but that's a different post....) of Opposed Systems Design recently posted that quote from Gibson in a post exploring the ideas and writings of that futurist author:

"More Gibson Reading".

I did not remember that quote from the book, but I was immediately reminded of two other things.

My recent post exploring the subject of SEI's, "Heads, Tails, and Edges", contained this nugget:

The Grudger’s calculations are greatly confused by the complexity of the system.  Anyone who has already come into contact with a Grudger provides that Grudger important data for making future decisions relating to interaction with that other, but mysterious strangers observed at a distance suggest mysterious data yet to be acquired.  In a complex and globalizing system, with waves of ramifications emanating from a distance, the Grudger will suspect that he must analyze the influence of distant others about whom he has precious little data — and also, that he must proceed to act, not wait a minute longer, in reaction to distant others, for his own actions may have ramifications against them.  The Grudger may ask, “Do I help to empower them?  What are they already doing to affect my own empowerment?”

The Cheater and the Sucker operate outside of time, in the sense that their orientations remain consistent come what may; but the Grudger is locked in the present (in this complex, globalizing world), always having to shift orientation in order to remain free and empowered.

Very odd how the corollary suddenly appears, since I didn't have Gibson's idea in mind when I wrote that.  I was stretching the limits of my metaphorization, viewing "the present situation" in terms of both, SEI's and the Sucker-Cheater-Grudger dynamic.

I was also reminded, by this corollary, of an old discussion I had with Arherring at my blog Phatic Communion, in which we considered Gibson's Pattern Recognition through the lens of 5GW.  The post has since been cross-posted to D5GW, but without the comments/discussion.

I suppose, now, that the guerrilla marketing referenced by the character Bigend, and the effort to get others to become "aware of something they don't quite yet know that they know" could be tied to the quote given at the beginning of this post.  Such marketing may help to provide the Grudgers with the analysis they cannot already make on their own.  Get them to come to a conclusion about "the present situation," and they can then act -- indeed, they will act, because they must.  It's in their nature.

Hmmmm......

Command and Control (C^2) theory is very well developed for 1GW, 2GW and 3GW campaigns. Joint Publication (JP) 6-0 lays a solid foundation for communications between different elements of a joint force, and each uniformed service has well-developed doctrine with respect to C^2. [Note: I have posted an abbreviated primer on the "generational" model of warfighting methods at Oz -- along with links to other primers by Zen, Tdaxp and Soob.]

In 4GW contests, C^2 becomes more problematic. Lines of authority are often blurred, and effective 4th Gen. warriors rely on mission-type orders (auftragstaktik) and operational empowerment seldom seen in more strictly regimented militaries. Similarly, 4GW's reliance on "Mass" -- one of the nine principles of war in conventional military thought -- is also dramatically different: allowing them to exploit a very small signal-to-noise ratio through dispersion in the general populace and leveraging commercial communications (mobile phones, IM, Internet) to convey "intent" or "objectives".

But where 4GW is primarily a moral conflict, there is something else -- something deeper that can be manipulated, influenced and exploited to achieve desired objectives. The morality of a 4GW campaign is not the most fundamental force that drives people and shapes their support for, or opposition to, or acquiescence to, a campaign.

That distinction belongs to the context by which we perceive the world. By altering how the world is perceived, one can achieve what Sun Tzu called the "acme of skill": victory without fighting.

This raises some interesting questions. For instance, does a 5GW force require cohesion and unity of effort? (I have argued in the past that it does not -- rather, that a 5GW force becomes increasingly effective the more disparate its efforts become).

But what does this do to the notion of "command"? We Americans love heirarchies -- rigid, singular command structures with no doubt who's "in charge". But is such a command structure valid for a 5GW campaign?

Or could a 5GW opponent be "commanded" simply through the naturally emergent behavior of complex systems? Is "self-synchronization" valid as a method of C^2 for a 5GW campaign? And is the notion of a "campaign" even relevant in this context? Or is our lexicon lacking in describing emergent methods of influencing thought -- and, by extension, limiting our actions to those that a faceless adversary allows?

--and every one important?

A lot of 5GW theory has focused on general broad aspects of the next generation of warfare, sometimes dipping into the esoteric and  philosophical basis of 5GW, and that's the way it should be.  Once on a post discussing EBO (crossposted here on Dreaming 5GW, although without comments), Sonny of FX Based expressed a complaint often expressed by those who do the really hard work operating in the field:

The theorist can theorize for years. The operator has to act under incredible pressure and on short notice.

This battle between theory and practice is really no battle, however ......