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Command and Control (C^2) theory is very well developed for 1GW, 2GW and 3GW campaigns. Joint Publication (JP) 6-0 lays a solid foundation for communications between different elements of a joint force, and each uniformed service has well-developed doctrine with respect to C^2. [Note: I have posted an abbreviated primer on the “generational” model of warfighting methods at Oz — along with links to other primers by Zen, Tdaxp and Soob.]
In 4GW contests, C^2 becomes more problematic. Lines of authority are often blurred, and effective 4th Gen. warriors rely on mission-type orders (auftragstaktik) and operational empowerment seldom seen in more strictly regimented militaries. Similarly, 4GW’s reliance on “Mass” — one of the nine principles of war in conventional military thought — is also dramatically different: allowing them to exploit a very small signal-to-noise ratio through dispersion in the general populace and leveraging commercial communications (mobile phones, IM, Internet) to convey “intent” or “objectives”.
But where 4GW is primarily a moral conflict, there is something else — something deeper that can be manipulated, influenced and exploited to achieve desired objectives. The morality of a 4GW campaign is not the most fundamental force that drives people and shapes their support for, or opposition to, or acquiescence to, a campaign.
That distinction belongs to the context by which we perceive the world. By altering how the world is perceived, one can achieve what Sun Tzu called the “acme of skill”: victory without fighting.
This raises some interesting questions. For instance, does a 5GW force require cohesion and unity of effort? (I have argued in the past that it does not — rather, that a 5GW force becomes increasingly effective the more disparate its efforts become).
But what does this do to the notion of “command”? We Americans love heirarchies — rigid, singular command structures with no doubt who’s “in charge”. But is such a command structure valid for a 5GW campaign?
Or could a 5GW opponent be “commanded” simply through the naturally emergent behavior of complex systems? Is “self-synchronization” valid as a method of C^2 for a 5GW campaign? And is the notion of a “campaign” even relevant in this context? Or is our lexicon lacking in describing emergent methods of influencing thought — and, by extension, limiting our actions to those that a faceless adversary allows?
Posted by deichmans on Aug 9, 2007 08:31 PM
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5 Comments
Intriguing!
I’ve discussed a 5GW campaign taking decades to evolve before. In this context I think the command structure would look to be an emergence of natural behavior, or better yet, maintain a mask of free will. In essence the longer the campaign the less detectable.
“But where 4GW is primarily a moral conflict, there is something else — something deeper that can be manipulated, influenced and exploited to achieve desired objectives. The morality of a 4GW campaign is not the most fundamental force that drives people and shapes their support for, or opposition to, or acquiescence to, a campaign.”
“By altering how the world is perceived, one can achieve what Sun Tzu called the “acme of skill”: victory without fighting.”
Funny. I’ve been tossing around the concept of ideology and how it relates to 4GW, could relate to 5GW and how the two contrast each other. I should have a post up this weekend regarding this line of thought.
I have been thinking that ‘a 5GW force’, to deserve such a designation, must have a unity of vision or it’s not a 5GW force although individual elements might be. However, ‘cohesion’, as it is normally conceived, and especially ‘unity of effort’ — again, as it is normally conceived — are far less important.
I suppose the distinction will depend on the scale of the battlefield being considered. Distinct operatives and operations may be quite disparate and have an immediate focus which is relatively localized for each; but their larger target is the system-as-whole which they know will not only be affected by what they do but will also itself affect what they do. So to be considered a 5GW force collectively, they would need a unity of vision which guides their individual and disparate activities. That vision would be the intended system-as-whole.
I do not believe hierarchies will play much of a role within such a ‘force structure’, unless there develops a common understanding of who within the force has imminent authority within any given domain or theater. For instance, one operative might be working Hollywood; another, the Kremlin: and the one will recognize the authority of the other within that other’s milieu — while also recognizing how one domain, his own, affects the others.
I have been thinking that ‘a 5GW force’, to deserve such a designation, must have a unity of vision or it’s not a 5GW force although individual elements might be.
Yes. If there is nothing uniting the actors…then they are not united. There are separate. If the actors are separate and not united in any way…then in aggregate it is wrong to consider them a 5GW force.
I really think lumping non-united actors together, looking for patterns, and calling it 5GW is a dead-end for 5GW theory.
5GW actors can certainly be united/synchronized/loosely-coupled by ideology/memes/purpose though of nothing else. There ability to give feedback to one another would be very limited and that would reduce their effectiveness would think depending upon what they are trying to do.
Very interesting, and this C&C (reminds me of Command and Conquer, if anyone is familiar with computer games), unity/cohesion issue is extremely relevant if one considers our operations in Afghanistan as attempts at 5GW (of the Barnettian variety). The last week saw press reports about tactical bombing killing civilians and doing more harm than good according to British military sources. Certainly the multinational character of the operation means there are limits to its cohesion, but this could be overcome with unity of vision in applying counterinsurgency doctrine if some form of Command and Control existed that could learn from negative experiences and translate that knowledge into tactical use. This doesn’t necessarily require C&C at a ‘higher’ operational level. Instead it could just be all our 5GW/counterinsurgent/nation-building platforms or organizations being highly linked and networked, so that learning by one platform can be immediately imparted to all other platforms, forming a kind of collective mind. Right now this plays out in the media as the British officials apparently leak their dispute to get us Americans to stop bombing. A faster way to do this needs to be found, and then maybe we might succeed at our 5GW.
Very nifty observations, Steve.
Mark at ZenPundit recently mentioned the idea of having these disparate yet interacting platforms for building resiliency and a kind of cohesion/unity of effort in the broadest sense. Complementarity? Or at the very least: not getting in each other’s way?